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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent judicial decisions reflect great skepticism about private 
antitrust enforcement. Most obviously, the Supreme Court in Bell 
Atlantic Corp. u. Twomblyl asserted that private antitrust class 
actions can force defendants to settle even meritless cases,2 a 
phenomenon some commentators have labeled legalized 
''blackmail.''3 Doubts about private antitrust enforcement have 
contributed to the courts taking extraordinary measures. In 
Twombly itself, the Supreme Court relied on those doubts in 
making it more difficult for plaintiffs to survive a motion to 
dismiss, a modification of the legal standard that arguably 
conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4 Similarly, 
various courts have followed Twombly's lead-and relied on its 
assertion of the dangers of antitrust class actions-in ratcheting 
up the showing plaintiffs must make to certify a class.5 Courts in 
recent years have also made it easier for defendants to obtain 
summary judgment in private antitrust cases.6 These changes 
have affected not only antitrust claims but private actions in 
1 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
2 Id. at 559. 
3 See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[Judge 
Friendly called) settlements induced by a small probability of an immense judgment in a 
class action 'blackmail settlements.' "). 
4 See Joshua P. Davis & Eric L. Cramer, Of Vulnerable Monopolists: Questionable 
Innovation in the Standard for Class Certification in Antitrust Cases, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 355, 
399-400 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1542143 
(noting the "Court arguably modified the pleading standard without following proper 
procedure"). 
5 See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320 (3d Cir. 2008) ("Factual 
determinations necessary to make Rule 23 findings must be made by a preponderance of the 
evidence. In other words, to certify a class the district court must find that the evidence more 
likely than not establishes each fact necessary to meet the requirements of Rule 23."); see also 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) ("Certification is proper only if 
the trial court is satisfied after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have 
been satisfied." (internal quotation marks omitted». 
6 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986) 
(summary judgment granted) ("[T)o survive a motion for summary judgment or for directed 
verdict a plaintiff seeking damages for violations of § 1 must present evidence that tends to 
exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators acted independently." (internal 
quotation marks omitted»; see also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Servo Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 
768 (1984) (affirming directed verdict in favor of plaintiffs) ("The correct standard [for 
directed verdict) is that there must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of 
independent action .... "). 
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general. 7 Some commentators suggest that judicial hostility to 
private antitrust claims has caused a shift in substantive antitrust 
law, one that also hinders public enforcement.8 Meanwhile, the 
prevailing view is that private antitrust enforcement causes all 
kinds of mischief.9 
It was not always so. For many years, the predominant belief 
was that private antitrust enforcement plays a crucial-even 
essential-part in protecting our economy from illegal conduct,l° 
Courts lauded plaintiffs' antitrust lawyers as "private attorneys 
general" and extolled their many virtues,ll They expressed 
reluctance to grant motions to dismiss or for summary judgment 
7 See generally Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010) (discussing the impact of Twombly 
on private actions). 
8 See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 41 (2008) 
(arguing judicial concerns about private antitrust enforcement have resulted in doctrines 
that undermine public enforcement). 
9 See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Modernization Commission 
Remarks 9-10 (June 8, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speecheslrosch/Rosch-AMC% 
20Remarks.June8.final.pdf (arguing that treble damage class action cases "are almost as 
scandalous as the price-fixing cartels that are generally at issue .... The plaintiffs' 
lawyers ... stand to win almost regardless of the merits of the case.'); see also FTC: WATCH 
No. 708, Nov. 19, 2007 at 4 ("[p]rivate rights of actions U.S. style are poison." (quoting William 
E. Kovacic speaking at an ABA panel on Exemptions and Immunities where he summarized 
the conventional wisdom in the field but was not necessarily agreeing with it». 
10 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130--31 (1969) ("[T]he 
purpose of giving private parties treble-damage and injunctive remedies was not merely to 
provide private relief but was to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust 
laws."); see also Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) 
("[Tlhe purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private action 
will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violation 
of the antitrust laws."), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence 
Tribe Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. N.J. Wood Finishing Co., 381 
U.S. 311, 318 (1965) ("Congress has expressed its belief that private antitrust litigation is 
one ofthe surest weapons for effective enforcement of the antitrust laws."). 
11 See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972) ("By offering potential 
litigants the prospect of a recovery in three times the amount of their damages, Congress 
encouraged these persons to serve as private attorneys general." (internal quotation marks 
omitted»; see also Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977) ("[U]ntil there are clear 
directions from Congress to the contrary, we conclude that the legislative purpose in 
creating a group of 'private attorneys general' to enforce the antitrust laws under § 4 ... is 
better served by holding direct purchasers injured .... "); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (noting that prerequisites for class certification are "readily met in 
certain cases alleging ... violations of the antitrust laws"). 
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and favored class certification in antitrust cases.l2 High 
government officials at the Department of Justice (DOJ) praised 
private enforcement.l3 And, of course, Congress itself long ago 
enacted a private right of action under federal antitrust law,14 and 
then expanded that private right of action,15 one that the courts 
have now significantly undermined. 
The issue, then, is whether this shift in attitude is justified. 
Putting aside any concerns about the legitimacy of courts resisting 
a private cause of action created by the legislature, have the critics 
of private antitrust enforcement made a solid evidentiary case for 
their views and for the legal reforms they have effected? This 
Article contends they have not. 
In seeking to answer that question, the Article analyzes the 
effects of private antitrust enforcement as it actually occurs in the 
United States. It places a special emphasis on class actions, the 
most important type of private cases. By doing this, it is able' to 
assess whether, overall, private enforcement creates significant 
benefits for society and, if so, the nature of those benefits. Our 
12 See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (denying summary 
judgment) ("We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex 
antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the 
hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot ... , Trial by 
affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury which so long has been the hallmark of even 
handed justice." (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Fortner 
Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 505 (1969) ("Since summary judgment in 
antitrust cases is disfavored ... the claims ... in this case should be read in the light most 
favorable to petitioner."). 
13 See Study of Monopoly Power: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82 Congo 
15 (1951) (Statement of H. Graham Morison, Assistant Attorney General in charge of 
Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice) ("I would say within the last 10 years ... we have for the 
first time since the history of the enactment of the Clayton Act and the Sherman Antitrust 
Act, begun to see the development of private litigation under the triple damages statute 
which is of substantial help . ... We begin to feel that we have some companion element of 
assistance in this which we have never had before .... Now presumably if you did away 
with the triple damages suit entirely and still wanted substantial enforcement in order to 
have economic freedom you would have to quadruple the size of the Antitrust Division."). 
14 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890) (repealed 1955 having 
been superseded by § 4 of the Clayton Act in 1914). 
15 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 
(2012)) (expanding remedy provided by the Sherman Act § 7 to persons injured as a result of 
violations of any of the antitrust laws); Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 5, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) 
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2012)) (enumerating a final judgment or decree in 
proceeding by government as prima facie evidence in case brought by a private party); 
Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 16, 38 Stat. 730, 737 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2012)) 
(providing injunctive relief for private parties). 
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examination also should help suggest areas where the private 
litigation system could be reformed and how those reforms should 
be structured. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II suggests issues it 
would be useful to address in determining the benefits and costs of 
private antitrust enforcement. The Article then relies on empirical 
evidence and analysis either to resolve those issues or, where that 
is not possible, to identify further appropriate empirical efforts and 
analysis. In undertaking this effort, Part II relies in large 
measure on our original empirical research consisting of 
summaries of sixty recent large and significant private antitrust 
cases. I6 
Part III then summarizes and assesses the major criticisms 
that have been leveled against private antitrust enforcement. We 
pay particular attention to the positions of those who have 
contested our earlier arguments in favor of private antitrust 
actions, including Daniel Crane of the University of Michigan and 
various officials at the Department of Justice. We are grateful for 
the attention our work has received as it offers hope for a focused 
debate and the potential for progress in understanding this 
important issue. A robust exchange serves as a crucible for 
discovering the truth. 
Part III explains that, although critics of private antitrust 
enforcement make many arguments, they can be placed in two 
16 Forty of these cases were analyzed in the authors' earlier article. The current Article 
builds upon and incorporates this work. See generally Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, 
Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 879 
(2008) [hereinafter Lande & Davis, Benefits], available at http://papers.ssrn.com!soI3/pa 
pers.cfm?abstract_id=1090661. For the underlying case studies, see generally Robert H. 
Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: Forty Individual Case 
Studies (Univ. of S.F. Law Research Paper No. 2011-22, 2008) [hereinafter Lande & Davis, 
Forty Case Studies], available at http://papers.ssrn.com!soI3/papers.cfm?abstract_id =1105523, 
and Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement 
and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 2011 BYU L. REV. 315 (2011) 
[hereinafter Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence], available at http://papers.ssrn.com!sol31 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1565693. Twenty additional cases were analyzed in a subsequent 
article. See generally Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Toward an Empirical and 
Theoretical Assessment of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 36 SEA'ITLE U. L. REV. 1269 (2013) 
[hereinafter Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment], available at http://papers.ssrn.com!soI3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2132981. For the underlying twenty case studies, see Joshua P. Davis 
& Robert H. Lande, Summaries of Twenty Cases of Successful Private Enforcement (Univ. of 
S.F. Law Research Paper No. 2013-01, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com!soI3/papers. 
cfm ?abstract_id= 1961669. 
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broad categories, and there is a strong tension between them. 
First, critics claim that private enforcement does too little-that it 
does not adequately compensate victims of antitrust violations, for 
example, or that it insufficiently deters antitrust violators. The 
natural conclusion from this criticism would be that private 
enforcement should be strengthened. But the critics instead tend 
to suggest that private enforcement is so deeply flawed that it 
should be restricted further or abandoned in its entirety.l7 
By contrast, the second type of criticism is that private 
antitrust enforcement does too much-that it overcompensates 
plaintiffs and overdeters anticompetitive conduct. Proponents of 
this view also tend to call for the elimination or curtailment of 
private antitrust litigation. 
Critics of private enforcement often support their arguments by 
noting that certain types of results from private enforcement are 
possible: private cases could result in settlements even if they 
completely lack merit; the settlements could consist largely of 
dubious coupons, obsolete products, worthless discounts, or cy pres 
distributions; and so on. We do not dispute that each of these 
outcomes could occur. 
But we dispute how often these results do occur. Do 95% of 
private cases lack merit or result in worthless remedies that fail to 
benefit the victims of the violations? Or are only 5% meritless? 
The difference is crucial. Yet critics assert that these scenarios are 
possible without ever presenting reliable evidence that they are 
common or typical. Indeed, often critics of private antitrust 
actions do not even present a single well-supported anecdote to 
illustrate assertions such as that in class action cases "issuing 
[class members] a check is often so expensive that administrative 
costs swallow the entire recovery."18 And critics never present 
systematic, reliable evidence that these outcomes occur a high 
proportion of the time. Yet, after critics note that these scenarios 
17 These same critics also typically assert that the European Union and other 
jurisdictions without private rights of action or with only limited rights of action should not 
expand private enforcement. For information about the current state of private 
enforcement in Europe and around the world see generally THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK 
ON PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAw (Albert A. Foer & Jonathan W. Cuneo 
eds., Edward Elgar, 2010) [hereinafter AAI HANDBOOK]. 
18 Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Priuate Antitrust Enforcement, 63 V AND. L. REV. 675, 682-
83 (2010). 
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are possible, they then declare victory by proclaiming them to be 
typical or common. 
Mter separating evidence from anecdote, and analyzing our 
own original empirical research as well as the empirical findings of 
others, we come to the conclusion that both broad categories of 
criticisms of private enforcement are so overstated that the 
resulting policy implications are the opposite of what many critics 
contend. Private enforcement on the whole likely does 
significantly undercompensate and underdeter, but not so woefully 
as to be essentially useless and beyond reform. On the other hand, 
and as somewhat of a corollary, it is highly unlikely that private 
enforcement-again, on the whole-overcompensates or 
overdeters. The call for the curtailment or abolition of private 
antitrust enforcement, then, is likely not only unwise, but also 
counterproductive. Much more useful would be consideration of 
ways to strengthen private enforcement so that it can serve as a 
more effective means of compensating victims and deterring 
potential transgressors. 
II. ASSESSING PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
A. WHAT WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW 
Before assessing the virtues and vices of private antitrust 
enforcement, it is worthwhile to consider what information and 
analysis would be helpful. Antitrust enforcement can serve two 
purposes: compensation and deterrence.l9 A complete analysis of 
private antitrust enforcement would involve assessing how well it 
fulfills each purpose and, perhaps, comparmg it to the 
contributions of public enforcement. 
1. Compensation. As to compensation, in an ideal world, we 
might identify every antitrust violation (detected and undetected), 
19 See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977) ("But § 4 has another purpose in 
addition to deterring violators ... ; it is also designed to compensate victims of antitrust 
violations for their injuries."); see also Am. Soc. of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 
U.S. 556, 575-76 (1982) ("[TJreble damages serve as a means of deterring antitrust 
violations and of compensating victims .... "); Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 
314 (1978) ("The Court has noted that § 4 has two purposes: to deter violators and deprive 
them of the fruits of their illegality, and to compensate victims of antitrust violations for 
their injuries." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting fllinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746». 
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determine the amount of harm each victim suffered, and assess 
whether private or public enforcement best compensated victims 
for that harm. We might also determine every time a private 
plaintiff obtained compensation in excess of actual damages. Of 
course, this is not possible. We of course do not know of 
undetected antitrust violations, we can rarely, if ever, be certain 
about the merits of those alleged violations that have been 
detected, and uncertainty plagues any inquiry into how much 
harm any victim suffered. 
A more feasible approach is available. To the extent the inquiry 
is comparative, we know that public enforcement functions almost 
purely as a deterrent.2o It does not generally attempt to provide 
compensation to injured victims.21 The issue, then, is whether 
private enforcement obtains any significant compensation in the 
right cases and confers it on the right parties. 
Various categories of information could be suggestive in these 
regards. The first category is how much plaintiffs have recovered 
in private antitrust cases. If the amount is trivial, then private 
antitrust enforcement does not seem to be very effective.22 Also, 
compensation in certain cases may be perceived as particularly 
valuable, such as when foreign actors prey on Americans. 
Second, a systematic analysis would be helpful of whether 
plaintiffs recovered when they should (or did not recover when 
they should not).23 Assuming such a systematic analysis is not 
20 See ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAw IN 
PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 1022 (2d ed. 2008) 
("The importance of each aim [deterrence, compensation, and punishment] varies among 
legal systems, but deterrence is often a preeminent goal, especially for public enforcement 
officials."). 
21 See id. at 1088 ("[P]rivate suits provide a means for compensation of the victims of 
antitrust violations, something that public enforcement actions may not be able to do or will 
only partially do."); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV. WORKLOAD STATISTICS 
FY 2003-2012, at 11 n.15, http://www.justice.gov/atr/publidworkload·statistics.html (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2013) ("Frequently restitution is not sought in criminal antitrust cases, as 
damages are obtained through treble damage actions filed by the victims."). 
22 See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 892-93 (indicating that recoveries in a 
case study of forty private cases totaled between $18.006 and $19.639 billion). 
23 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 21.1, at 593 (7th ed. 2007) 
(''The objective of a procedural system, viewed economically, is to minimize the sum of two 
types of cost. The first is the cost of erroneous judicial decisions.") (the other is minimizing 
the cost of the litigation system); see also David McGowan, Between Logic and Experience: 
Error Costs and United States v. Microsoft Corp., 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1185, 1186 n.2 
(2005) (defining error costs as "the social cost of mistaken decisions," a false positive error 
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possible, it could prove useful to know about: (1) cases in which 
plaintiffs recovered substantial sums and their claims appear to 
have been meritorious;24 (2) cases in which plaintiffs recovered 
substantial sums and their claims appear not to have been 
meritorious;25 (3) cases in which plaintiffs failed to recover and 
their claims appear to have been meritorious;26 and (4) cases in 
which plaintiffs failed to recover and their claims appear not to 
have been meritorious.27 This analysis might indicate whether 
private enforcement has resulted in appropriate or inappropriate 
compensation. 
A third category of information pertains to the allocation of 
funds. Any recoveries in private cases might not reach the actual 
injured parties for various reasons. The recovered money might go 
to the attorneys who prosecute the litigation or the claims 
administrators who oversee the allocation or payment process.28 
cost as "when a court wrongly fmds liability based on conduct that is actually efficient," and 
a false negative error cost as "when a court wrongly finds no liability based on conduct that 
is actually inefficient"). 
24 See generally Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16 (analyzing forty cases and 
plaintiffs' recoveries). 
25 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (implementing a higher 
pleading standard out of concern that defendants would be forced to settle "even anemic 
cases" due to fear of excessive costs); see also Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 
343 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (cautioning that increasing courts' jurisdiction on 
antitrust matters may induce frivolous claims and trivialize the federal courts). 
26 See ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 129 
(2003) (defining false positive as "a meritorious suit that is dismissed ... or not filed 
because of the fear of dismissal"). Note that undercompensation can occur even if plaintiffs 
obtain some relief. For example, Professor Connor reported that every DOJ criminal 
conviction for collusion in his sample resulted in at least one private follow-up case. These 
cases, however, produced a median recovery of only approximately 30% of the cartels' 
overcharges, and often considerably less. See John M. Connor, Private Recoveries in 
International Cartel Cases Worldwide: What Do the Data Show?, 11-14 (AAl Working Paper 
No. 12-03, 2012), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/-antitrustlsites/defaultlfilesl 
WorkingPaperNo12-03.pdf (discussing private action recoveries). This means it is very 
common for the current system of private enforcement to significantly undercompensate the 
victims of illegal collusion. This undercompensation is rarely even noted in analyses of the 
issues, and even more rarely is it factored into policy analysis. Author Lande is working 
with Professor Connor to arrive at a more precise estimate of the preliminary figure 
presented in Professor Connor's cited work. 
27 See BONE, supra note 26, at 128--30 (explaining that the opposite of a false positive or 
false negative is a true positive or true negative-in effect when the court's decision was 
correct). 
28 See Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 
1051, 1111-12 (1996) [hereinafter Koniak & Cohen, Cloak] ("Thus, [defendants] are well-
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Further, the plaintiffs may not be the harmed parties.29 This can 
occur in part because of the structure of antitrust doctrine. In 
particular, in federal antitrust cases, only those who pay 
overcharges directly to antitrust violators (so-called "direct 
purchasers")-not those who are harmed further down the chain of 
distribution (so-called "indirect purchasers")-generally may seek 
to recover damages.3o Indirect purchasers may recover damages 
only in state law actions.31 Information would be helpful about 
whether recoveries go to those who actually suffer harm and about 
the portions of recoveries that go to those who did not suffer harm. 
To the extent such information is not available, theoretical 
analysis may· help. An inquiry into the likely effects of an 
antitrust violation may cast light on whether the parties who 
recover damages are apt to be the ones that were injured. 
A similar inquiry can help to determine whether private 
enforcement is likely to result in overcompensation or 
undercompensation.32 One issue is whether the outcome of trial 
positioned and well-motivated to propose a deal that gives class counsel a huge slice ... of a 
small pie ... and pretty well-assured that class counsel will accept it, given how expensive 
and risky it can be to get a class action certified and ready for trial."); see also Edward 
Cavanagh, Antitrust Remedies Revisited, 84 OR. L. REV. 147,214 (2005) ("Many class action 
suits generate substantial fees for counsel but produce little, if any, benefit to the alleged 
victims of the wrongdoing."). Similarly, Steve Newborn, co-head of Weil, Gotshal & 
Manges's Antitrust/Competition practice, was asked which areas of antitrust need reform 
and replied, "Class actions: they are increasingly beneficial only to plaintiffs' law firms and 
not to consumers." Q&A with Weil Gotshal's Steven A. Newborn, LAw360 (May 26, 2009, 
12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/competition/articles/1033589;Crane.supranote18.at 
683 (asserting that in private antitrust class actions "administrative costs swallow the 
entire recovery"). 
29 See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 764-65 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("For 
in many instances, consumers, although indirect purchasers, bear the brunt of antitrust 
violations. To deny them an opportunity for recovery is particularly indefensible when 
direct purchasers, acting as middlemen, and ordinarily reluctant to sue their suppliers pass 
on the bulk of their increased costs to consumers farther along the chain of distribution."). 
30 See id. at 746 ("It is true that, in elevating direct purchasers to a preferred position as 
private attorneys general, the Hanover Shoe rule denies recovery to those indirect 
purchasers who may have been actually injured by antitrust violations."). 
31 See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105--06 (1989) (holding that state law 
allowing indirect purchasers' recovery is not preempted by federal antitrust law under the 
decision in fllinois Brick; the Court also indicated that Congress intended the Sherman Act 
to supplement, not replace, state common law and statutory remedies). 
32 See Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust 'Treble" Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 115, 122-24, 130-36, 158-68 (1993), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/paper 
s.cfm?abstract_id=1134822 (demonstrating that so-called "treble" damages are actually only 
approximately compensatory damages); see also Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 
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tends to be exceSSIve or insufficient to compensate injured 
parties.33 Nominally, plaintiffs pursuing federal-and some 
state-antitrust claims are entitled to treble damages.34 That may 
mean their recovery will be excessive. Other considerations, 
however, may suggest otherwise, such as limitations on the 
availability of prejudgment interest and on various categories of 
damages.35 The dynamics of settlement negotiations may also 
prove cruciaJ.36 In this regard, it is important to keep in mind not 
only the incentives of the parties but also those of the attorneys 
who represent them. This point applies with particular force to 
the plaintiffs' attorneys in class actions, who, as has long been 
recognized, exercise a great deal of control over litigation. This 
theoretical discussion-particularly when combined with the 
empirical evidence discussed above-may illuminate whether 
plaintiffs are likely to receive too much or too little compensation 
as a result of private antitrust enforcement. 
2. Deterrence. Some of the information relevant to 
compensation also bears on the issue of deterrence. Again, in an 
ideal world, we would know of every antitrust violation and the 
harm it caused. We would also know the odds of the actors being 
caught and punished. We could then compare that information to 
determine whether the deterrence effects of private enforcement-
and public enforcement-are appropriately calibrated. We would 
also like information about anticompetitive and procompetitive 
behavior that never occurred because of the risk of antitrust 
sanctions.37 Again, however, reality forces us to work with more 
limited information. 
883 n.21 Oisting the specific categories of damages necessary to compensate antitrust 
victims). 
33 See Lande, supra note 32, at 159-68. 
34 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012); see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-114 (2012) ("[S]uch person 
may recover three times the actual damages."); HAw. REV. STAT. § 480-14 (2012) ("[T]o 
secure threefold damages for injuries."); MINN. STAT. § 325D.57 (2012) ("[S]hall recover 
three times the actual damages sustained."). 
35 See Lande, supra note 32, at 122-24, 130-36 (discussing damages categories not 
permitted under antitrust laws). 
36 Edward D. Cavanagh, Attorneys' Fees in Antitrust Litigation: Making the System 
Fairer, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 51, 77 (1988) ("[A]ttorneys have an economic incentive to 
effectuate settlements earlier in the litigation and may pressure clients to accept a 
settlement that is less than what could have been achieved .... "). 
37 See GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 20, at 1111 ("The mere filing and prosecution 
of an antitrust case sometimes alters the defendant's conduct."). 
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A first cut at the likely deterrence effects of private enforcement 
might be possible by assessing the total amount of money paid by 
defendants. Shy of obtaining that information, some measure of 
defendants' expenditures would be useful. 38 
Also, much like with compensation, it is important whether 
defendants are mulcted in the right cases. A sense of the 
correlation between actual antitrust violations and antitrust 
penalties would allow for an assessment of what are often called 
Type I and Type II errors.39 These types of errors involve, 
respectively, defendants incurring sanctions when they should not 
and defendants not incurring sanctions when they should. A 
systematic account of the incidence of these errors would be ideal. 
Without that systematic account, representative-or at least 
illustrative-information would be helpful. 
Further, comparing the efficacy of private and public 
enforcement makes sense. Toward this end, it would be valuable 
to know the total monetary burden imposed on antitrust 
defendants by private enforcement as well as the burden of 
sanctions imposed by government--or, as an imperfect substitute, 
by important governmental actors such as the Department of 
Justice.40 That might be able to tell us which has the greater total 
deterrence effects.41 It would also be useful to see the impact of 
antitrust litigation on stock prices, which provide another way of 
measuring the incentives litigation creates to abide by the 
antitrust laws.42 
Information about the kinds of cases in which private 
enforcement occurs could also elucidate how much it contributes to 
deterrence. For example, private plaintiffs might play a 
38 See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 892-97 (analyzing private antitrust 
recoveries and comparing the deterrence effects of private and criminal litigation). 
39 Compare Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger 
Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1580, 1670 (1983), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/pa 
pers.cfm?abstract_id=1684227 (defining Type I error costs as when courts prevent beneficial 
behavior and Type II error costs as when courts allow undesirable behavior), with BONE, 
supra note 26, at 129 (defining Type I errors as "false positives" that occur when 
"meritorious" suits are either dismissed or not flled and Type II errors as "false negatives" 
that occur when a "frivolous suit" is not dismissed). 
40 See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 892-95 (comparing private recoveries 
with criminal fines). 
41 See id. (arguing that private cases provide more deterrence than criminal cases). 
42 See discussion infra Part I.B.4. 
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complementary role to public enforcement if they bring cases in 
which there is no government action or no such action has 
occurred until the private plaintiffs file suit.43 Private plaintiffs, 
for example, may take on rule of reason cases while at least some 
government enforcers-notably, the Department of Justice-may 
tend to act only in per se cases.44 Or there may be evidence that 
the government is risk averse and will pursue only those actions it 
is almost certain to win, whereas private plaintiffs may be willing 
to take somewhat greater chances.45 On the other hand, if private 
plaintiffs bring cases attacking only the same behavior that the 
government has already prosecuted, that would strike against the 
value of private enforcement. 
Further, the analysis of the likely outcomes at trial and in 
settlement will cast light on deterrence. It matters whether 
defendants really are subject to treble damages if judgment is 
entered against them,46 and also whether that potential liability 
causes defendants, for example, to pay excessive sums even when 
43 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 681 n.36 (1986) ("Although the conventional wisdom has long been that 
class actions tend to 'tag along' on the heels of governmentally initiated suits, a recent study 
of antitrust litigation by Professors Kauper and Snyder has placed this figure at '[l]ess than 
20% of private antitrust actions flied between 1976 and 1983.''' (quoting W. John Moore, 
Data Galore in Georgetown Damage Study, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 4, 1985, at 24»; see also 
infra note U8. 
44 See POSNER, supra note 23, at 666 ('There is an independent reason why most public 
agencies have much higher than 50 percent win rates. Agencies unlike private enforcers 
operate under a budget constraint. An agency with a tight budget constraint may not bring 
any close cases. (This is true of most criminal enforcement today.) Therefore, although most 
of its cases will be settled its trials will be selected from a population of one sided cases.'). 
45 Id. at 665--66; see also Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARy 
L. REV. 75, 78 (2010) (explaining general rule proposed by a DOJ report that there would be 
no "no enforcement unless evidence demonstrated 'substantial disproportion[ality], between 
anticompetitive harm and the procompetitive benefit caused by the conduct in question" 
(quoting U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT 
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 90, 105 (2008»). But see Christine A. Varney, 
Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for the 
United States Chamber of Commerce: Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in this Challenging 
Era 5-7 (May 12, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/spee ches/245777.pdf 
(criticizing the DOJ for offering companies too much leeway in cases involving 
procompetitive benefits). 
46 See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 882-83 ("It is possible ... that even 
[treble damages are] necessary to compensate plaintiffs for the difficulty of bringing suit, for 
una warded prejudgment interest, and for difficult-to-quantify unawarded damages 
items .... "). 
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they are innocent.47 An understanding of these dynamics can 
provide insight into whether the deterrence effects of private 
antitrust enforcement are likely to be insufficient or excessive. 
Finally, it would be valuable-even if just for a subset of 
cases-to know the likely profits from antitrust violations, the 
sanctions imposed by those violations, and the odds that the 
violations would be detected and successfully prosecuted. That 
information would be suggestive of whether overall enforcement 
results in excessive or insufficient deterrence effects. 
B. WHAT WE KNOW 
Having set forth what we would like to know to evaluate 
private antitrust enforcement, it is striking how little we actually 
do know. Most of the key questions remain unanswered. The 
great bulk of the argument about private enforcement of the 
antitrust laws has been premised on unsubstantiated or 
insufficiently substantiated claims. As far as we know, we have 
provided the only effort to gather information about how a 
significant number of private actions actually proceeded and the 
results they produced. Our original study canvassed forty cases.48 
We now have analyzed an additional twenty cases.49 We believe 
that the time and energy invested in that undertaking casts 
valuable light on how private enforcement actually works in 
practice.50 
That said, it is important to note various limitations on our 
studies. No effort was made to collect a comprehensive or 
representative sample of cases. To the contrary, we included a 
disproportionate number of exceptionally large cases, which means 
47 See id. at 885 n.29 (questioning whether "the costs of discovery for plaintiffs are trivial 
but can be exorbitant for defendants"). 
48 See generally Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16 (aggregating and analyzing forty 
antitrust cases to determine the effects of private antitrust enforcement). 
49 See generally Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16 (comparing and 
contrasting twenty new cases to the previous study of forty cases). 
50 Because almost every case settled, they were extremely difficult to research. We 
looked for cases that returned a significant amount of money damages to the victims, but 
we did not, for example, look for cases that were per se as opposed to rule of reason, that 
involved direct instead of indirect purchasers, or that did or did not involve coupons or cy 
pres grants. For additional information on our screening criteria, see Lande & Davis, 
Benefits, supra note 16, at 889-91. 
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we were disproportionately likely to select class action cases. 
Moreover, class action settlements must receive court approval 
and are a matter of public record. In contrast, in non-class action 
cases parties often insist on confidentiality, impeding research. 
Further, we deliberately selected cases that appear to have had 
significant merit. For all of these reasons it would be 
inappropriate to make any strong empirical claims about whether 
private antitrust actions on the whole tend to be meritorious based 
on an analysis of these sixty cases. 
Our purpose was to assess some of the benefits from private 
enforcement, not to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. In assessing 
these benefits, we sought to avoid subjective assessments of value. 
As a result, we did not include cases that obtained an injunction as 
the only or primary form of relief. Nor, in analyzing quantitative 
recoveries, did we include equitable relief (or coupons, products, 
rebates, or discounts). Equitable relief may be extraordinarily 
valuable, but its benefits are difficult to measure.51 As a result, 
the information we collected provides only a substantial 
understatement of the benefits of private actions. Our study does 
not provide a sense of the most that private actions may have 
achieved, or even any notion of how much they probably have 
achieved or how often or typically they have achieved those 
results. 
With these qualifications in mind, let us turn to the information 
we identified as potentially useful in assessing the merits of 
private antitrust enforcement. In doing so, the sixty cases we have 
studied playa prominent role. 
1. Compensation 
i. Recoveries by Private Plaintiffs. Private antitrust 
enforcement provides virtually the only way to compensate victims 
of antitrust violations. To be sure, government actors have 
mechanisms by which they can seek relief for victims, but they are 
limited and too rarely pursued. 52 So it is a great virtue of private 
51 "In the Tobacco litigation, for example, the result was an apparent transformation in 
the tobacco market spanning numerous years and worth an estimated $484 
million .... None of that sum is included in the analysis below." Davis & Lande, Empirical 
Assessment, supra note 16, at 1272 n.16. 
52 For a discussion of parens patriae actions by state attorneys general and disgorgement 
actions by the federal enforcers see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 884 n.25. 
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enforcement if it can wrest ill-gotten gains from violators of the 
antitrust laws and return them to those to whom they rightly 
belong. And that is what private enforcement has done. The forty 
cases in our first study revealed a total recovery in private 
antitrust cases of $22.4 to $24.4 billion. 53 The new study reflects 
$11.4 billion in additional recoveries.54 The total in the sixty cases 
we studied is $33.8 to $35.8 billion. 55 
Also significant are the recoveries from foreign entities. The 
original forty cases involved recoveries from foreign actors of $5.7 
to $7 billion out of a total of $18 to $19.6 billion before inflation.56 
In the twenty additional cases, we were able to identify with 
confidence $394 million recovered from foreign actors, as well as 
$591 million from corporate families that included both foreign 
and U.S. entities, although we could not determine whether the 
foreign entities were the sources of the funds. 57 In total for the 
sixty cases in our study, between $6.1 and $8 billion was recovered 
from foreign corporations.58 
ii. Indicia of Merits Regarding Recoveries. As far as we 
know, no one has ever documented a significant number of cases in 
which private plaintiffs obtained substantial recoveries III 
meritless cases. 
In contrast, we have various reasons for concluding that the 
cases we have studied involve, on the whole, meritorious claims.59 
The first is that most of the cases garnered substantial 
settlements.60 The smallest recovery was $30 million; only a few 
53 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1324-26 tbl.A8. 
54 [d. at 1274. 
55 All recoveries were from 1990 onwards and have been expressed in 2011 dollars unless 
specifically noted. 
56 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1288. 
57 [d. 
58 [d. 
59 It is difficult to develop an objective measure of merit for purposes of an 
empirical analysis. If merit means that in an objective sense the 
plaintiffs in an antitrust case should prevail, it would seem that a 
substantive analysis of claims would be necessary to determine whether 
they are meritorious .... 
To avoid this quagmire, we rely for present purposes on a legal 
positivist understanding of the law-one that relies on prediction, not 
prescription. 
[d. at 1279. 
60 [d. 
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cases recovered less than $50 million.61 Defendants would be 
unlikely to pay such large sums merely to avoid the costs of 
litigation.62 Only the meaningful prospect of losing litigation-
including after exhausting the appellate process-could explain 
settlements for such large amounts.63 We are very skeptical about 
claims that defending these suits often costs innocent firms $10 
million or more.64 We would believe this only for very unusual 
cases. Fifty million dollars, then, is likely to be well above the 
nuisance value of a frivolous case.65 Moreover, plaintiffs in thirty-
six of the sixty cases (60%) from our study recovered more than 
$100 million.66 Since actions that settle for more than $50 million 
are not nuisance lawsuits, the recoveries almost surely reflect the 
defendants' perception that they could well lose on the merits, not 
only at trial but also on appeal.67 
Second, most of the cases from our study received validation-
whether in whole or in part-through other aspects of the private 





1. In 17 of the 60 cases (28%), defendants or their 
employees were subject to criminal penalties, 
generally through guilty pleas.69 
2. In 17 of the 60 cases (28%), government 
enforcers obtained a civil recovery, usually in 
the form of a consent order.70 
65 Id. at 1280. 
66 Id. 
It is difficult for a business to believably claim, in effect: 'We are saints who 
did absolutely nothing wrong. Nevertheless, we paid $50 million or $100 
million or more just to make the case go away." While we are not asserting 
this can never happen, this argument loses credibility as the settlements 
get higher. 
Id. at 1280 n.47. 
67 Id. We explain below, see infra Part II.c, why defendants are unlikely to settle 
meritless cases for substantial sums. 
68 Lande & Davis, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1280 n.47. 
69 See id. at 1280 (describing thirteen of forty cases and five of an additional twenty cases 
as subjecting defendants or defendants' employees to criminal penalties, generally through 
guilty pleas). 
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3. In 15 of the 60 cases (25%), plaintiffs survived 
or prevailed on a motion for summary judgment 
(or partial summary judgment or judgment as a 
matter oflaw).71 
4. In 14 of the 60 cases (23%), defendants lost at 
trial in the private litigation or III a closely 
related case.72 
5. In at least 13 out of 60 cases (22%) plaintiffs 
survived a motion to dismiss. 73 
6. In 11 out of the 20 new cases (55%), the court 
certified a class for litigation purposes. (We did 
not record this information for the original 40 
cases.)74 
19 
In sum, fifty-three of the sixty cases (88%) had at least one 
indicator that the plaintiffs' case was meritorious.75 TABLE 4, 
below, summarizes this information. 
70 See id. (describing twelve of forty cases and five of an additional twenty cases as 
granting government enforcers a civil recovery, often in the form of a consent order). 
71 See id. at 1280--81 (describing plaintiffs as prevailing on a motion for summary 
judgment or partial summary judgment in nine of forty cases and five of an additional 
twenty cases). 
72 See id. (describing defendants as losing at trial in the private litigation or a closely 
related case in nine of forty cases and four of an additional twenty cases). 
73 See id. (describing plaintiffs as surviving a motion to dismiss in three of forty cases and 
eleven of an additional twenty cases). This does not mean that numerous cases failed to 
survive a motion to dismiss. In many cases such a motion was not made. Moreover, we did 
not systematically report motions to dismiss for the original forty cases we studied. Recent 
legal developments-including a stricter standard on motions to dismiss-suggest a change 
in approach, so we did not report plaintiff surviving motions to dismiss in the twenty new 
cases. Id. at 1280--81 & nA9. 
74 See id. at 1281 (describing courts as certifying a class for purposes of litigation in 
eleven out of twenty cases). We did not report certification of litigation classes for the 
original forty cases. Much as with motions to dismiss, however, courts have become more 
willing to assess the merits in deciding whether to certify a class. Id. Certification of a 
litigation class therefore indicates plaintiffs' claims have a substantial evidentiary basis. 
75 The percentages appear to total more than 100% because many of the cases involved 
more than one basis for validation. Id. at 1280 nA8. 
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TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF KINDS OF VALIDATION IN CASES 
Kind of Validation of Merits Number of Cases 
Criminal Penalty 17 out of 60 (28%) 
Government Obtained Civil Relief 17 out of 60 (28%) 
Defendants Lost Trial in Same or 
15 out of 60 (25%) 
Related Case 
Plaintiffs Survived or Prevailed at 
Summary Judgment or Judgment 14 out of 60 (23%) 
as a Matter of Law 
Plaintiffs Survived Motion to 
13 out 60 (22%) Dismiss 
Class Certification for Litigation 12 out of 20 (60%) 
At Least One Basis for Validation 53 out of 60 (88%) 
At Least One Basis for 
Validation, Not Including 
47 out of 60 (78%) 
Surviving Motion to Dismiss 
Third, many of the opInIons contain generous praise for the 
plaintiffs' counsel handling the case.76 For example, of the eight 
judges from whom we were able to discover explicit and generous 
praise for the conduct of plaintiffs' attorneys (in none of the cases 
did we discover criticism), five were appointed by a Republican 
president.77 This too helps provide assurance that the cases 
brought by private counsel generally were not reflective of 
partisan politics. 
For various reasons, the party affiliation of the judges who 
presided over the cases we studied provides reason to believe that 
those cases were generally meritorious. The judges were 
76 For examples see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 903-04. 
77 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1284. 
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appointed by both Republican and Democratic presidents.78 If the 
judges in the cases we studied were all ideologically aligned with 
plaintiffs' attorneys, their praise for the attorneys' work might not 
mean as much.79 One could also suspect-although the suspicion 
might be implausible-that the cases succeeded only because of 
overly sympathetic judges.80 In other words, judicial ideology, 
rather than the merits, might explain the relief private plaintiffs 
obtained.81 
Further, even though almost all of the sixty cases were only 
settlements, it should be recalled that a federal judge approved all 
of the class action settlements as fair, reasonable, and adequate. 
While this certainly is not the same as a final verdict, this 
approval by a diverse group of federal judges has some 
significance.82 We note that of the sixty-five federal judges who 
presided over part or all of the cases we studied, forty-one were 
appointed by a Republican president.83 We also note that this 
litigation occurred during an era when almost every Supreme 
Court antitrust decision has been decided in favor of the 
defendant.84 Fifteen of the last sixteen antitrust decisions by a 
Court rated by Judge Posner as the most conservative since 
1930,85 including every case except one86 decided after 1992, ruled 
78 See id. at 1285 (showing that twenty-seven of the forty-five judges involved in the first 
forty cases we studied were appointed by Republican presidents); see also id. at 1328 
tbl.All (showing that fourteen of the twenty judges involved in the second group of twenty 
cases we studied were appointed by Republican presidents). 
79 Id. at 1284. 
80 Id. at 1284-85. 
81 Id. at 1285. 
82 Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 903-04. We do not mean to put undue 
weight on this point. Judges are supposed to protect class members-not defendants-in 
approving class action settlements. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 
(1997) (noting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) protects unnamed class members from unfair 
settlements). So a judge's approval of a class action settlement does not necessarily mean 
the claim was meritorious. Indeed, just about any settlement should warrant approval if a 
class action lacks any merit. Still, judges can make settlements difficult if they believe 
plaintiffs have pursued a class action with no basis in law or evidence. 
83 See Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence, supra note 16, at 362-64 tbl.ll (listing all 
the judges and their appointing presidents in the cases we studied). 
84 See Andrew I. Gavil, Comment, Antitrust Bookends: The 2006 Supreme Court Term in 
Historical Context, 22 ANTITRUST 21, 22 (2007) ("The last clear plaintiffs' victories in the 
Court occurred in 1992 .... "). 
85 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical 
Study 6-7, 46 tb1.3 (John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 404) (ranking Justices 
from most to least conservative), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstra 
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against plaintiffs.87 Given that this tide of pro-defendant 
instruction effectively told the lower courts how to decide close 
cases, and given the high percentage of judges presiding in the 
litigation we studied that were appointed by Republican 
presidents, one would not expect praise of the work of plaintiffs' 
attorneys, undue fear by defendants and their counsel of a biased 
judge, or approval of the class action settlements based on any pre-
existing excessive judicial sympathy for plaintiffs' attorneys.88 
Everyone of these indicators is evidence, but not proof, that 
these private antitrust cases involved anticompetitive behavior. 
Ultimately there is no obvious way to prove or fully refute 
assertions that many or most private cases are unmeritorious and 
are tantamount to extortion. We submit, however, that the above 
analysis should, at a minimum, give rise to a presumption-likely 
a strong presumption-that the cases involved legitimate claims. 
We know of no reason, moreover, to believe the opposite. 
Ln. Allocation of ReCOiJeries. Another question relevant to 
the success of private antitrust enforcement involves the 
proportions of any recoveries that go to plaintiffs as opposed to 
others, such as attorneys and claims administrators. In a perfect 
world, plaintiffs would receive the full recovery. To the extent 
they do not, that may compromise the compensatory function of 
private antitrust litigation. 
To be sure, this issue has a normative dimension. The plaintiffs 
in an antitrust case receive a valuable service from their 
attorneys-just as the defendants do. So it is not clear how to 
treat attorney's fees. One might think of the funds plaintiffs' 
attorneys receive out of any recovery as not contributing to the 
compensation of plaintiffs. Alternatively, one might think of the 
injury to plaintiffs as comprising any monetary and other harms 
cUd=1126403. 
86 Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2217 (2010) (treating NFL 
teams as separate entities for marketing and antitrust purposes). 
87 Gavil, supra note 84, at 22 (''The last clear plaintiffs' victories in the Court occurred in 
1992 in two cases, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), and 
FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992)."). The Supreme Court subsequently 
decided Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2201; Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 555 
U.S. 438 (2009) (9-0 in the judgment, 5-4 in the Court's opinion); NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, 
Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998); and Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
88 See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 903-{)4 (providing examples of praise 
given by judges to plaintiffs' attorneys). 
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they suffer as a result of an antitrust violation, including their 
need to retain counsel to vindicate their rights. From the latter 
perspective, the money plaintiffs recover that allows them to pay 
their attorneys should be included as part of their compensation; 
the injury from an antitrust violation should be understood to 
encompass all of the financial and other costs incurred in 
litigation. 
In any case, we studied the proportion of attorney's fees courts 
awarded plaintiffs as part of the resolution of private antitrust 
cases. We found, on the whole, an inverse relationship between 
the size of a recovery and the percentage of the recovery awarded 
as attorney's fees. Although attorney's fees awards varied 
significantly within each category, counsel tended to recover 
approximately one third in cases with recoveries below $100 
million and a similar or smaller percentage in cases with 
recoveries between $100 and $500 million.89 The percentage 
generally declined as the recovery increased (although the Tricor 
case is a notable exception with a 33.3% award and a recovery of 
$316 million).90 It should be stressed, however, that these 
percentages ignore any injunctive or non-monetary relief obtained 
by plaintiffs. To the extent that these forms of relief could be 
valued, the legal fees expressed as a percentage of the recoveries 
should be lowered accordingly from the reported values. 
The mean of the fees in the original study was either 25.6% or 
14.3%, using, respectively, an unweighted and weighted average 
(because larger cases tend to produce attorney's fees that are a 
lower percentage of the settlement).91 These results were roughly 
consistent with the results of an earlier study using a different 
sample, which found unweighted mean legal fees of 21.02% in 
antitrust class action cases.92 While these percentages are not 
trivial, they are lower than ordinarily occur in individual 
89 See Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1293-95 (showing the 
percentage of recovery that went to attorney's fees in the cases we studied). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1322-24 tbIs.A6 & A7. 
92 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action 
Settlements: 1993-2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248, 266 tb1.5 (2010) (containing 
statistics for seventy· one antitrust cases and finding mean fees of 21.02% and median fees 
of 9.15%). 
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contingency fee cases and leave the great majority of the recovery 
to the plaintiffs. 
We made no similarly systematic mqUIry into the 
administrative costs in the cases we studied. We were, however, 
able to assemble some pertinent information from claims 
administrators. Indirect purchaser actions are most relevant in 
this regard because they tend to involve a relatively large number 
of plaintiffs entitled to relatively small recoveries. The concern 
expressed by various commentators is that administrative costs 
tend to consume most or all of the money in indirect purchaser 
cases.93 The information we obtained undermines this view. 
The mean percentage of the recoveries allocated to 
administration is relatively modest at 4.1%, which is essentially 
the same as the median at 4.07%/4.14%.94 The range is from 
0.03% to 9.25%.95 These numbers are not nearly as high as the 
critics of private enforcement suggest. The mean for indirect 
purchaser actions is 5.6%, somewhat higher than for direct 
purchaser actions at 3.2%,96 and the medians are slightly lower-
5.3% for indirect purchasers and 3.06% for direct purchasers.97 
In sum, administrative expenses do not appear to deprive 
private antitrust enforcement of the ability to achieve 
compensation for at least a couple of reasons. First, rather than 
consuming almost all of the recovery in indirect purchaser actions, 
they consume on average only about 5%-6%. Second, direct 
purchaser and competitor cases-which involve even lower 
93 See Crane, supra note 18, at 682 (arguing indirect purchasers often receive no 
recovery). 
94 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1307-08 tb1.11. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. In a sense, these percentages exaggerate the proportion of recoveries spent on 
administrative costs. In calculating the means, we gave equal weight to each case rather 
than weighing cases with larger recoveries more heavily. Given that larger recoveries 
generally involve lower administrative costs as a percentage, the total percentage of private 
recoveries used to pay for administration is likely substantially lower than the 4.1% we 
report, and the same point applies in analyzing the indirect and direct purchaser actions. 
We took our approach for two reasons. First, we did not have the amount of the recovery for 
all of the indirect purchaser cases, so a weighted mean would not be possible for them. 
Second, we wanted our numbers to reflect the most worrying cases, which are the small 
ones that have relatively high administrative costs as a percentage. 
97 Id. 
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administrative expenses-play the primary role III private 
antitrust enforcement.98 
2. Deterrence 
i. Total Liability and Indicia of the Merits. In terms of 
deterrence effects, the total amount private plaintiffs have 
recovered is again relevant. Thirty billion dollars of liability 
creates a strong incentive to abide by the antitrust laws.99 
Anticipation of that potential liability should have had a powerful 
deterrence effect (although, obviously, not enough to deter the 
conduct at issue in those cases).lDO Moreover, that amount likely 
understates the financial repercussions of private antitrust 
enforcement for defendants. Litigation costs-including, notably, 
attorney's fees-and disruption of business activities add to the 
ultimate sanctions defendants suffer,lol Moreover, at least for 
these sixty cases, the indicia of merits discussed above suggest 
that defendants likely should have been liable in these cases. 102 
Thus, the $30 billion would on the whole seem to have provided 
appropriately targeted efforts at deterrence. 
To be sure, liability in cases where there is no antitrust 
violation could compromise the value of private enforcement as a 
means of deterrence. To the extent antitrust violators are held 
liable for conduct that is not illegal, private actions may 
discourage procompetitive conduct,lo3 Similarly, if actors in the 
marketplace may be held liable even when they act legally, they 
will have less incentive to make sure their behavior conforms to 
98 See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 747 (1977) (allowing only direct purchasers-
not indirect purchasers-to recover overcharge damages under federal antitrust law). But 
see California v. ARC Am. Exp., 490 U.S. 93, 105-06 (1989) (permitting indirect purchaser 
actions at the state level). 
99 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessments, supra note 16, at 1272. 
100 Id. 
101 On the other hand, as discussed below, the amount is diminished because, inter alia, 
defendants generally do not have to pay prejudgment interest, in effect receiving an 
interest· free loan. 
102 See supra TABLE 4 and accompanying discussion. 
103 We say "may" because it is not necessarily true that legal conduct is procompetitive. 
For example, horizontal competitors may be able to achieve anticompetitive behavior 
without the kind of agreement or understanding that would have rendered it illegal-
indeed that was the defendants'position in Twombly-but discouraging that behavior might 
still be procompetitive. Brief for Petitioners at 23-27, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544 (2007) (No. 05·1126). Of course, it is also possible that in some instances behavior that 
violates the antitrust laws is nevertheless procompetitive on the whole. 
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the law so as to avoid liability.104 But, as noted above, we know of 
no study showing a single case-much less a significant or 
representative number of cases-involving a substantial recovery 
in an antitrust case that lacked any merit. 
3. Comparing the Deterrence Effects of Private and DOJ 
Criminal Enforcement. Based on the initial forty cases, we argued 
that the more than $20 billion of damages likely had a greater 
deterrence effect than all of the DOJ's criminal enforcement efforts 
during the same period. lo5 The additional $10 billion recovered in 
the twenty new cases we studied reinforces our earlier analysis.lo6 
From 1990 through 2011, the total of DOJ corporate antitrust 
fines, individual fines, and restitution payments totaled $8.18 
billion. lo7 Disvaluing a year of prison at $6 million and a year of 
house arrest at $3 million adds another $3.588 billion in total 
deterrence from the DOJ's anti-cartel cases.108 This totals 
approximately $11. 7 billion.109 Although this is an extremely 
impressive figure, it is significantly less than the $34-$36 billion 
resulting from the sixty private cases for the same period.l lo 
Moreover, we ignored the costs to defendants of providing 
products, discounts, or coupons as part of settlements, paying their 
own attorney's fees and costs, and suffering a disruption of their 
business practices.ll1 Indeed, given the disparity between our 
conclusions about private and DOJ criminal enforcement, even a 
104 See Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1279 n.44 (arguing that 
punishing innocent defendants would be expected to undermine deterrence of 
anticompetitive behavior). 
105 Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence, supra note 16, at 317. 
106 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1274. 
107 Id. at 1277. 
108 Id. Note that the $6 million per year value (or disvalue) of prison time includes the 
offender's lost salary and future income, as well as his or her diminished utility from 
serving a prison sentence. See Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence, supra note 16, at 
327-28 (elaborating on the disvaluation of prison time). 
109 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1277. 
110 Id. Since some of the private cases were follow-ups to DOJ actions, however, some 
portion of the deterrence from these private actions should be ascribed to the initial DOJ 
investigation. See infra Part II.B.S.i for a discussion of follow-on. 
111 Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence, supra note 16, at 337-38. To be fair, in 
defending against a DOJ criminal action, corporations also incur costs and suffer 
disruption, factors we similarly ignored in our analysis. Id. We also ignored the value of 
injunctive relief, whether secured by government or private enforcers. Id. at 346. 
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significantly more conservative approach would yield the same 
ultimate conclusion.112 
4. Effects on Stock Prices. There is an alternative way to 
measure the deterrence effects of antitrust enforcement other than 
by the amount of money defendants are forced to pay. That 
method is measuring the cha:p.ge in the value of a defendant's stock 
when it is sued for violating the antitrust laws. 
The evidence suggests that antitrust litigation has a significant 
effect on stock prices. One study showed, for example, that the 
filing of a government antitrust case causes the value of shares to 
drop on average by 6% and the filing of a private case by 0.6%.113 
A drop in share values by 0.6% is significant. As the authors of 
the article finding a 0.6% drop explain, "The average wealth loss 
for defendants is approximately 0.6[%] of the firm's equity value, 
or an average loss of $4 million. It appears that plaintiffs can and 
do damage defendants by a lawsuit."114 
Interpreting these data requires some care. It would be easy to 
jump to the conclusion that the expected penalties from 
government litigation are more harmful to a corporation than the 
expected penalties from private litigation. Attention to this issue, 
however, suggests that the opposite is likely true. 
112 See id. at 340. For example, only if prison time were disvalued at more than $43 to $48 
million per year on average would the DOJ cases result in more deterrence than the 
original forty private cases. [d. The additional twenty cases have driven that number even 
higher. Moreover, the conventional views within the antitrust field concerning the typical 
conduct of government enforcers and the plaintiffs' bar could help magnify the relative 
deterrence effects of private enforcement. Government enforcers are often portrayed as 
reasonable, responsible, and rational public servants whose activity is subject to intense 
public scrutiny. A conventional view of plaintiffs' attorneys, by contrast, is that they are an 
unethical and crazed pack of jackals, willing to go to any length-to do anything no matter 
how unfair-to attack defendants and strip them to the bone. For this reason, government 
enforcement could engender relatively less fear among corporations and therefore provide 
less deterrence. To be sure, plaintiffs' attorneys are, at times, described as selling out class 
members-a stereotype that could cut the other way. 
113 DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 179 
(2011) (citing John M. Bizjak & Jeffrey L. Coles, The Effect of Private Antitrust Litigation on 
the Stock-Market Valuation of the Firm, 85 J. AM. ECON. REV. 436, 437 (1995); Kenneth D. 
Garbade et aI., Market Reaction to the Filing of Antitrust Suits: An Aggregate and Cross-
Sectional Analysis, 64 REV. ECON. & STAT. 686, 671 (1982». 
114 Bizjak & Coles, supra note 113, at 437; see also Moin A. Yahya, The Law & Economics 
of "Sue and Dump':' Should Plaintiffs' Attorneys Be Prohibited from Trading the Stock of 
Companies They Sue?, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 425, 432 (2006) (noting impact of this sort is 
material)_ 
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From the perspective of the value of a defendant's stock, the 
financial consequences of private litigation are likely to be far 
more important than the financial consequences of government 
litigation. For example, consider our comparison of the total 
recoveries in our sixty cases to the total penalties imposed by the 
DOJ during the same period, 1990 to 2011. We found that in just 
those sixty cases, defendants ended up being liable for 
approximately $34 to $36 billion.115 The DOJ was able to obtain 
various forms of incarceration of individuals, but it is difficult to 
see why those individual punishments would cause any significant 
loss in the value of the shares of stock of a corporation. The fines 
that the DOJ imposed totaled slightly over $8 billion, about 22%-
24% of the private recoveries.1l6 The significantly larger private 
recoveries strongly suggest that any drop in share value would 
result from anticipated financial losses in private litigation rather 
than government litigation.117 So the great majority of the total 
6.6% stock drop is probably attributable to the anticipated loss of 
money by the corporation as a result of private recoveries. 
Why, then, does a company's stock drop far more on average 
from the filing of a government action than a private action? One 
likely reason is that when the government files an antitrust case, 
private litigation almost always follows. A comprehensive 
database, for example, reflects that private litigation occurred 
after every single cartel case filed by the DOJ.l18 In a reasonably 
efficient market, investors would appreciate that government 
antitrust litigation almost invariably leads to private antitrust 
litigation. The stock drop caused by the private litigation, then, 
should largely occur at the time of government filing, even if the 
private litigation is filed later. 
Just as we need to take care to attribute a stock drop at the 
time of filing of a government action to anticipated financial 
115 See supra Part 1I.B.l.ii (discussing private recoveries from our sixty case sample). 
116 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, at 1290, 1309 (totaling $8 billion in government 
recoveries and calculating this as a percentage of private recoveries). 
117 See id. at 1309-lO. To be sure, these numbers are approximate. On one hand, our 
studies no doubt missed a great number of the private cases between 1990 and 2007. On the 
other hand, the DOJ is but one branch of the federal government, so the penalties it imposes 
do not reflect, for example, enforcement efforts by the FI'C or the state attorneys general. 
liB See Connor, supra note 26, at 11 ("[O]f the 52 international cartels that were fined by 
the DOJ during 1990-2005, lOO% were followed up with private damages actions."). 
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penalties from private litigation, we also should take care about 
allocating credit. In some cases, there might not have been any 
private action at all without the government action. And the 
government litigation may well contribute significantly to the 
success of the private action, such as by offering the benefits of 
issue preclusion. So the private penalties may be primarily 
responsible for the loss of values in corporate shares, but that does 
not mean private enforcement deserves the lion's share of the 
credit for that effect. 
Finally, note also that the average 0.6% stock drop from the 
filing of private litigation is surprisingly high if government 
litigation is almost always followed by private litigation. We 
might not expect any stock drop at all on average when the 
inevitable follow-on litigation is filed. The market should have 
already adjusted at the time of initiation of the government 
proceeding. Indeed, the 0.6% average drop may mask very 
different phenomena. Private cases not preceded by government 
action may involve a much more significant stock drop and private 
cases preceded by government action may involve a smaller drop 
or none at all. This is an area where additional empirical work 
would be valuable. Meanwhile, it is important to know whether 
private cases occur before government litigation or when there is 
no government litigation and, on a somewhat related issue, 
whether there are certain kinds of cases only private plaintiffs are 
likely to bring. In this regard, the sixty cases we studied again 
prove instructive. 
5. The Complementary Role of Private Enforcement. An 
important issue involves the kinds of cases private plaintiffs bring. 
Some commentators suggest that private actions generally follow 
and depend on government actions.l19 If that were true, private 
plaintiffs might not contribute as much to deterrence as if they 
were to bring independent cases. Similarly, at least one 
commentator has indicated-commendably, relying on empirical 
119 See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden, Scott D. Hammond & Belinda A. Barnett, Deterrence and 
Detection of Cartels: Using All The Tools and Sanctions, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 207, 227-33 
(2011) ("Plaintiffs' lawyers now rely on the work done by the Antitrust division more than 
ever."). Werden, Hammond, and Barnett criticize our analysis of private antitrust 
enforcement at some length. For a response, see Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, 
supra note 16, at 1295--1304. 
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efforts-that private cases almost always lose unless they involve 
per se claims as opposed to claims relying on the rule of reason.120 
This, too, might suggest a limited contribution to deterrence by 
private antitrust actions. Government enforcement tends to focus 
on per se antitrust violations. If private cases are successful only 
when they do the same, then they do not add as much to overall 
enforcement as they might. Finally, and related, it would be 
helpful to know if private actors might be less averse to risk than 
government actors, potentially deterring conduct that is 
anticompetitive but is not sure to result in successful prosecution. 
i. Follow-on Cases. The sixty cases we studied show that 
private litigation is not in fact always preceded by government 
litigation and, indeed, that sometimes private litigation occurs 
when there is no government litigation at all. Of the sixty cases, 
twenty-four were not preceded by government action,l21 and 
another twelve involved a substantially different action than the 
government pursued.l22 Those groups of cases involved, 
respectively, $8.8-$10.1 billion and $10.7 billion.l23 Private 
120 Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 
GEO. MAsON L. REV. 827, 830 (2009). 
121 This is consistent with John M. Connor's finding that a large share of private cartel 
cases are not follow-on lawsuits. Connor, supra note 26, at 10. Connor's survey of private 
cartel cases filed in U.S. courts reveal that "41% of the treble-damages cases were non-
follow-on." Id. at 11. This means that "they were not preceded by any known government 
sanctions in either the United States or elsewhere," although a few may have followed 
antitrust investigations that were ultimately closed. Id. (footnote omitted). Further, 
Connor adds: "An alternative metric is to use the monetary size of the recoveries. In terms 
of publicly reported dollar settlements, the U.S. follow-on cases garnered only 26%, the non-
U.S. follow-ons a shrunken 2%, and the non-follow-ons an impressive 72% of the $39 billion 
total." Id. at 12. However, Connor cautions that "the non-follow-on category is strongly 
affected by the bankcard cases." Id. 
122 See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 910 (listing nine private actions more 
inclusive than the corresponding government enforcement actions); Davis & Lande, 
Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1293 tbl. 7 (listing three private actions more 
inclusive than the corresponding government enforcement actions). 
123 See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 892, 898, 910 (including cases with 
recoveries of $7.631 billion to $8.981 billion where no government action preceded the 
private case and recoveries of $3.477 billion where the private party sought recovery 
significantly broader than the government action); Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, 
supra note 16, at 1292-93 (including cases with recoveries of $1.127 billion where no 
government action preceded the private case and recoveries of $7.230 billion where the 
private party sought recovery significantly broader than the government action). 
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actions in this way play a complementary role to government 
actions .124 
Note that we do not mean to overstate the importance of 
whether private litigation or government litigation comes first. 
The timing and amount of work spent investigating and 
prosecuting an antitrust case may not correspond to the timing of 
filing a case. The order of filing serves as a somewhat useful proxy 
for allocating credit for success, but it is highly imperfect. 
ii. Per Se v. Rule of Reason. A related issue is whether 
private plaintiffs succeed only when they pursue per se claims.125 
If they do, they contribute to antitrust enforcement less than they 
might if they succeeded in other claims. An interesting and 
surprising result from our empirical efforts-one that we have not 
emphasized in the past-"is that a substantial portion of private 
recoveries occurred in cases subject to the rule of reason, as well as 
in cases in which it was unclear whether the rule of reason or a 
per se rule would apply."126 In the sixty cases, we found that pure 
rule of reason cases predominated.127 "Over $17 billion of the more 
than $30 billion in total recoveries came in rule of reason cases, 
and over $2 billion came in mixed cases, leaving only about $10 
billion-or a third of the total-in pure per se cases."128 These 
findings suggest that private litigation may play an important 
complementary role to public litigation by challenging conduct 
that the government-and especially the DOJ-may rarely 
address.129 
m. Risk Aversion: Private v. DOJ. Another interesting 
conclusion is suggested by private plaintiffs pursuing litigation 
independently of public litigation and prosecuting claims under 
124 See Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1273 (emphasizing that 
private actions can supplement the limited mechanisms for relief provided by government 
actors); Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 90~7 (explaining that private antitrust 
actions complement government enforcement by combating under-deterrence). 
125 See Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1272-73 (noting that an 
interesting question surrounding antitrust cases is whether the conventional wisdom is 
correct that private plaintiffs prevail only in per se cases). 
126 Id. at 1289. 
127 Id. at 1273. 
128 Id. at 1290. 
129 See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 905-06 (explaining that private 
enforcement complements government enforcement because the government cannot 
practically be expected to do all or even most of the necessary enforcement). 
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the rule of reason rather than just under a per se standard. 
Private plaintiffs may not be as averse to risk as government 
litigators.13o Again, a comparison to the DOJ is illustrative. 
In our original comparison of private enforcement and DOJ 
enforcement, we noted that the DOJ appears to succeed in a very 
high proportion of its cases. 131 From 2000 to 2009, it won 
anywhere from thirty-one to sixty-seven antitrust cases and lost 
four in one year and from zero to two cases in all other years.132 In 
its worst year, it prevailed over 90% of the time.133 
We do not know the rate at which private plaintiffs are 
successful.134 But almost certainly they prevail at a much lower 
rate. This conclusion is suggested by the willingness of private 
plaintiffs to pursue cases other than following a government filing. 
It is even more powerfully suggested by their pursuit of rule of 
reason cases. The rule of reason entails a high degree of 
uncertainty that can readily result in a successful defense. 135 This 
proposition is confirmed by Michael Carrier's work, which 
identifies 221 rule of reason cases between 1999 and 2009 in which 
a court entered final judgments against plaintiffs (and only one in 
which a court entered final judgment in favor of a plaintiff).136 
Moreover, any plausible model based on expected value would 
indicate that plaintiffs would pursue claims with a lower chance of 
success than the DOJ appears to require. This evidence and 
analysis suggests that private plaintiffs bring riskier claims than 
government actors, helping to ensure some deterrence effects when 
behavior is anticompetitive but will not necessarily result in 
successful prosecution of a claim. 
130 See Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence, supra note 16, at 349 ("In most cases, if the 
law is somewhat unclear, or if the evidence of illegal conduct is not absolutely compelling at 
the outset of a legal action, the DOJ does not seem to be willing to pursue litigation."). 
131 See id. at 328 n.42. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. We do not mean this point as a criticism. The DOJ should be more circumspect in 
pursuing criminal cases than private enforcers are in pursuing civil cases. 
134 See Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1270 (stating that the 
2008 study of forty private antitrust cases appears to constitute the only systematic effort to 
gather information about the results of private actions). 
135 The uncertainty surrounding rule of reasons cases stems in part from the fact that 
courts will compare the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the alleged conduct. 
Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 881. In contrast, in per se cases proof of the 
conduct suffices to establish a violation oflaw. Id. 
136 Carrier, supra note 120, at 830. 
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6. Overall Deterrence Effects: A Study. The evidence discussed 
above is suggestive, but it does not provide a systematic analysis of 
the deterrence effects of private enforcement. We know of only one 
such systematic effort, co-authored by one of us. It analyzes 
seventy-five cartels, assessing the total sanctions that were 
imposed on the wrongdoers and the total profits they appeared to 
reap from their illegal conduct.137 The article also gathers 
evidence and theory on the rate at which illegal antitrust 
conspiracies are discovered and successfully prosecuted.13S The 
ultimate conclusion of this analysis is that the total sanctions-
public and private-from antitrust enforcement are insufficient for 
optimal deterrence. 139 In terms of expected value, illegal antitrust 
conspiracies remain a profitable endeavor-which explains their 
persistence,14o Indeed, based on the seventy-five cases, the overall 
level of sanctions would have to increase at least threefold-and 
perhaps by as much as ten times-to achieve optimal 
deterrence.141 Of course, this analysis applies only to cartel cases 
and not to other forms of anticompetitive conduct.142 But as the 
only effort of its kind, it provides valuable evidence that private 
enforcement does not result in excessive deterrence effects. 
c. ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL JUDGMENTS AND SETTLEMENTS 
The evidence we have, while limited, thus supports some 
important conclusions, even if it does not establish them with 
certainty. We can cast additional light on the subject by 
combining the existing evidence with an analysis of the relevant 
legal standards and the incentives they create. 
Conventional wisdom focuses on three features of private 
antitrust enforcement. First, the law appears to impose excessive 
liability,143 Plaintiffs under federal antitrust law-and under the 
137 John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime 
Pays, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 427, 429-30 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pape 
rs.cfm?abstract_id=1917657. 
138 Id. at 462--68. 
139 Id. at 476-79. 
140 Id. at 479. 
141 See id. at 428 (calculating that current sanctions are only 9% to 21 % of optimality). 
142 Id. 
143 See William E. Kovacic, Private Participation in the Enforcement of Public Competition 
Laws, in 2 CURRENT COMPETITION LAw 167, 173--74 (Mads Andenas et al. eds., 2004) 
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laws of some states-are entitled to treble damages, an automatic 
tripling of the amount a judge or jury awards in an antitrust 
case.l44 Further, in addition to direct purchasers recovering the 
full overcharges they pay under federal law, the same conduct may 
give rise to liability to indirect purchasers under state law as well 
as to sanctions imposed as a result of legal action by federal and 
state governments. 145 The potential for multiple enforcement 
actions has led to the claim that the total exposure of antitrust 
defendants is too great.146 
Second, some commentators characterize class actions in 
general, and antitrust class actions in particular, as "extortionate 
settlements."147 They speculate that in class actions the potential 
for great liability based on the outcome of a single trial can cause 
even innocent defendants to settle meritless claims rather than 
risk a catastrophic-and errant-adverse decision.148 
Third, some commentators claim that plaintiffs' class action 
lawyers have incentive to "sell out" the classes they represent.l49 
They note that the lawyers generally do best on an hourly basis by 
settling relatively quickly, even at a steep discount from the 
expected value of a case.150 The attorneys can further sacrifice the 
(asserting courts may fear overdeterrence from plaintiffs seeking treble damages); Stephen 
Calkins, Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, with Special Attention to 
Summary Judgment and to Motions to Dismiss, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 185, 
185-200 (Lawrence J. White ed., 1988) (discussing the impact of treble damages on the 
evolution of antitrust law). 
144 See generally Robert H. Lande, New Options for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: 
Protecting the Real Victims of Antitrust Violations, 61 ALA. L. REV. 447 (2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1267202 (analyzing state and federal 
treble damages provisions). 
145 See generally id.; Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (holding that indirect 
purchases may not use an offensive pass-on theory to recover damages). 
146 See Robert H. Lande, Five Myths About Antitrust Damages, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 651, 657-62 
(2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=12634 78 (discussing 
courts sorting out damages to prevent defendants from paying excessive damages). 
147 J. Thomas Rosch, Fed. Trade Comm'r, Designing a Private Remedies System for 
Antitrust Cases-Lessons Learned from the U.S. Experience, Remarks before the 16th 
Annual EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop 10 (June 17, 2011); see also Jonathan M. 
Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the 
Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 843 (1974) (describing plaintiffs' 
attorneys as using class actions to ''blackmail'' businesses). 
148 Rosch, supra note 147, at 10. 
149 See Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 471-72 (2000) 
(asserting that class action lawyers' self-interest incentivizes them to settle early and often). 
150 Id. at 470--73. 
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interests of the class by seeking money for themselves and a less 
valuable form of compensation for the class, such as coupons.151 
Note the strong tension between these views. The first two 
points suggest that plaintiffs are likely to recover and defendants 
to pay too much, particularly in class actions, and the third point 
suggests that plaintiffs are likely to recover and defendants to pay 
too little, especially in class actions. It is difficult to imagine they 
are all correct. How, then, can we know which of these points 
predominates in practice? 
A few considerations can help. A key point is that, for various 
reasons, the claim is weak that defendants may pay three or more 
times the injuries plaintiffs actually suffered. Defendants do not 
generally pay prejudgment interest in antitrust cases, so they 
benefit from what is essentially an interest-free loan.152 Given the 
long delay between a violation and resolution through trial or 
settlement, the real recovery in private litigation is significantly 
less than three times the actual harm. Similarly, defendants often 
are not held liable for various kinds of harm their antitrust 
violations cause, including umbrella effects of market power153 and 
allocative inefficiency.154 As one of us has written elsewhere, in 
reality antitrust damages are not treble actual harm, but more 
likely approximately one times actual harm.155 And settlements 
are even lower-a median of only 30% of the actual overcharges. 156 
A second consideration is that defendants pay damages only if 
their antitrust violations are detected, challenged, and ultimately 
lead to some form of sanction. The best estimates are that no more 
151 See infra note 178 and accompanying text. 
152 See Lande, supra note 32, at 130 (noting that automatic interest only accrues after a 
judgment for plaintiff). 
153 Umbrella effects can occur when a non-participant in an antitrust violation raises 
prices. This can happen, for example, when a cartel with less than 100% of a market raises 
prices. Yet, umbrella effects are very rarely awarded in antitrust cases. See id. at 147-51 
(arguing proof problems prevent awards for umbrella effects). 
154 Allocative inefficiency involves buyers shifting the purchases they make because of 
inefficiencies produced in the market by an antitrust violation. Faced with inflated prices, a 
buyer, for example, may purchase no item at all or purchase one that does not have the 
same value to them as would the price-fixed good if it were sold at a competitive price. 
Although the allocative inefficiency effects of market power are almost universally 
denounced, we are unaware of even a single United States antitrust case that has even 
computed it. [d. at 152-53. 
155 [d. at 171 (noting the mean estimate was only 68% of actual damages, not 300%). 
156 Connor, supra note 26, at 14. 
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than 30% of cartels are detected.157 Even if discovered, they may 
not be prosecuted if, for example, a private action does not make 
economic sense because the damages are too low and the costs of 
litigation too high. And they may be prosecuted unsuccessfully 
even if defendants should be held liable. For all we know, this 
may have occurred in Twombly.158 
A third consideration, related to the first two, is that the 
incentives in settlement encourage recoveries in private antitrust 
that are too small rather than too large. Even if in theory 
defendants after trial could be required to pay more than single 
damages for violating the antitrust laws, the reality is that the 
vast majority of cases settle.159 The primary issue, then, is how 
settlement dynamics figure in the resolution of litigation. -
Antitrust defendants likely have a significant advantage over 
plaintiffs in settlement negotiations for various reasons. First, as 
noted above, antitrust defendants are the beneficiaries of interest-
free loans. 160 Plaintiffs suffer and defendants benefit from delay, 
placing defendants at a significant advantage in negotiations. 
Second, antitrust defendants tend to be rich and powerful 
economic actors.161 That is why they are in a position to exploit 
market power to the detriment of the plaintiffs, who usually are in 
a more vulnerable position. 162 This disparity can affect the 
litigation process. Plaintiffs will often lack the resources to 
tolerate the expense and disruption that litigation entails. 
Moreover, while commentators sometimes suggest that litigation 
costs fall disproportionately on antitrust defendants, 163 the 
157 See Connor & Lande, supra note 137, at 465 (noting estimates that no more than 30% 
of cartels are detected). 
158 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 566 (2007) (asserting only that nothing in the 
complaint made a conspiracy plausible, not that there was no conspiracy). 
159 See generally Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16 (discussing cases that settled). 
160 See Lande, supra note 32, at 130 (noting automatic interest accrues only after 
judgment for an antitrust plaintiff). 
161 Joshua P. Davis & Eric L. Cramer, Antitrust, Class Certification, and the Politics of 
Procedure, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 969, 979 (2010). 
162 [d. 
163 See Rosch, supra note 147, at 11 (suggesting that defendants typically spend more than 
plaintiffs during discovery). 
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evidence on this issue is at least mixed.l64 Those costs may well 
fall as heavily on antitrust plaintiffs. 
Shifting the focus from the incentives before the parties to those 
before the attorneys reveals a third reason to believe settlements 
in private antitrust actions are likely to be too small. As noted 
above, plaintiffs' attorneys generally receive a contingency fee as a 
percentage of the recovery.165 They also have to wait until a 
recovery to obtain any compensation for the time they have 
expended and the costs they have incurred; just like the plaintiffs, 
they in effect provide an interest-free loan, albeit a voluntary one. 
As a result, they tend to obtain the best return on their time if 
they settle cases quickly, even for a relatively small amount. 166 
Defense attorneys, in contrast, are paid by the hour.l67 They 
therefore fare best in protracted litigation. Of course, we do not 
mean to be cynical. Many ethical lawyers sacrifice their own 
interests to those of their clients. But to the extent we look at the 
incentives before attorneys, they reinforce the conclusion that 
recoveries in private antitrust cases are apt to be too small rather 
than too large. Defense attorneys will benefit from driving a hard 
bargain whereas plaintiffs' attorneys do best by settling early, 
even if for a relatively modest amount. 
D. PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS 
The evidence on the whole, then, weighs in favor of private 
antitrust enforcement. As to compensation, we know of at least 
sixty major cases in which private plaintiffs obtained substantial 
recoveries and their claims appear to have been meritorious. We 
also know that some of those cases involved recoveries from 
foreign actors preying on U.S. victims. In contrast, we do not 
know of any substantiated cases in which plaintiffs recovered 
164 See, e.g., Thomas E. Willging et aI., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure 
Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 548 (1998) 
(providing evidence that plaintiffs may incur costs higher than or equal to those of 
defendants in high-cost litigation). 
165 See Davis & Cramer, supra note 4, at 371-72 (explaining plaintiffs' attorneys usually 
front litigation costs and recover these costs only upon a recovery); Davis & Cramer, supra 
note 161, at 980 (stating that plaintiffs' lawyers typically operate on a contingency fee 
basis). 
166 Davis & Cramer, supra note 4, at 372; Davis & Cramer, supra note 161, at 980. 
167 Davis & Cramer, supra note 4, at 371; Davis & Cramer, supra note 161, at 980. 
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when they should not have done so. The attorney's fees in private 
antitrust cases are significant, but they are no larger than in other 
contingency fee cases and decrease significantly as a percentage of 
total recovery as the total recoveries increase. Moreover, the 
administrative costs appear to be relatively modest, even in 
indirect purchaser actions. 
Private enforcement also contributes a great deal to deterrence. 
It may have greater deterrence effects than criminal enforcement 
by the DOJ and at least plays an important complementary role to 
government efforts. Private attorneys at times file suit before the 
government and at times there is no corresponding government 
action at all. Notwithstanding the conventional view to the 
contrary, private attorneys also obtain substantial recoveries in 
rule of reason cases and, more generally, may be more tolerant of 
risk than government enforcers. 
This evidence, as well as some basic attributes of antitrust 
enforcement, supports some provisional conclusions. Although 
defendants appear to be exposed to treble damages or more, in 
reality, they are likely to be liable for much less for various 
reasons: antitrust damages are restricted, antitrust violators will 
not always get caught, and plaintiffs have incentive to settle for 
much less than the expected value of litigation. What we currently 
know, then, suggests that private antitrust enforcement plays a 
valuable role in compensating victims and deterring antitrust 
violations, but it likely would need to be strengthened to perform 
either function at an optimal level. 
III. CRITICISMS OF PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
The conventional wisdom in the antitrust field long has been 
that private enforcement, and especially class action cases, 
accomplish little or nothing and might well be counterproductive. 
This prevailing belief was well summarized by former FTC 
Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch, who claimed that treble damage 
class action cases "are almost as scandalous as the price-fixing 
cartels that are generally at issue.... The plaintiffs' 
lawyers ... stand to win almost regardless of the merits of the 
2013] DEFYING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 39 
case."168 As a result of these widespread beliefs, former FTC 
Chairman William E. Kovacic summarized the conventional 
wisdom about private enforcement succinctly and correctly: 
"private rights of actions U.S. style are poison."169 
We have surveyed the many criticisms that have been made of 
private antitrust enforcement. They can be classified into one of 
five categories if each is defined broadly: (1) private enforcement 
does not adequately compensate the real victims of antitrust 
violations; (2) private enforcement does not adequately deter 
antitrust violations; (3) private enforcement usually does not 
address anticompetitive conduct; (4) private enforcement 
over deters anticompetitive conduct or deters procompetitive 
conduct; and (5) the attorneys for plaintiffs sell out their clients. 
This Part seeks to determine whether there is any systematic 
evidence to support these criticisms.l70 It puts aside 
unsubstantiated anecdotes (which often are self-serving). The only 
fair way to assess the net efficacy of private antitrust enforcement 
is by carefully analyzing systematic and reliable evidence of 
whether these criticisms reflect reality, or whether they are 
hypotheticals, assertions, anecdotes, or exceptions. It is important 
to ascertain the empirical facts so the United States can select the 
optimal policy regarding private enforcement. Further, in light of 
the widespread interest in creating or modifying private antitrust 
remedies in Europe and elsewhere in the world,l7l where the 
conventional wisdom about the United States experience seems to 
168 Rosch, supra note 147, at 9--10. Similarly Steve Newborn, co-head ofWeil, Gotshal and 
Manges' Antitrust/Competition practice, was asked which areas of antitrust need reform and 
replied, "Class actions: they are increasingly beneficial only to plaintiffs' law firm [sic) and not 
to consumers." Q&A With Weil Gotshal's Steven A. Newborn, LAw 360 (June 2, 2009), http:// 
competition.law360.comJarticles/l03359. 
169 See FTC: WATCH, supra note 9. For additional criticisms of private antitrust 
enforcement, see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 883-89, and Davis & Lande, 
Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1269--70. 
170 We are not disputing that critics' anecdotes may be true or that they raise important 
concerns about abuses in particular cases. Private antitrust enforcement certainly is not 
perfect. Neither is government enforcement or decisions by courts or commissions. But 
there is a huge difference between a critic of private enforcement providing an anecdote-
particularly one that neutral observers have a hard time evaluating-and the systematic 
data that should be used to make policy. 
171 See generally AAl HANDBOOK, supra note 17 (describing efforts undertaken 
internationally concerning private antitrust enforcement). 
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undermine private enforcement, ascertaining the facts becomes 
even more significant. 
Before addressing each of these criticisms separately, however, 
we again note that they fall into two broad categories. The first 
category of arguments suggests, roughly speaking, that private 
antitrust enforcement does not do enough-providing insufficient 
compensation for antitrust violations or insufficiently deterring 
those violations. The second category suggests that private 
enforcement does too much---creating, for example, excessive 
deterrence effects. 
The most straightforward conclusion that should flow from the 
first set of criticisms-private antitrust enforcement does too 
little-is that private enforcement should be strengthened. If 
private enforcement results in inadequate compensation or 
deterrence, we should increase the amount that plaintiffs may 
recover or amend procedures permitting defendants to pay 
insufficient sums. But the critics we will discuss have not reached 
those conclusions. They argue instead that private enforcement 
fails so terribly in its aims that it cannot be fixed and should be 
abandoned or restructured entirely,172 That position should 
require critics to carry a heavy burden. As we shall see, they have 
not succeeded. 
Another preliminary point is important: there is a strong 
tension between the two categories of criticisms. While it is 
conceivable that private antitrust enforcement both does too much 
and does too little, that possibility is unlikely, and the more 
specific arguments made in favor of the two views are often flatly 
at odds. The result is a view of private antitrust enforcement that 
is overwhelmingly negative and often, taken together, internally 
inconsistent. 
A. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT DOES NOT COMPENSATE THE REAL 
VICTIMS 
Critics often argue that private enforcement, and especially 
class action cases, do a poor job of compensating the real victims of 
172 See William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Private Antitrust Enforcement: The New 
Learning, 28 J.L. & ECON. 405, 440 (1985) (arguing the current system should be replaced 
with a system of exclusive government enforcement). 
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illegal behavior.l73 There are many reasons given for this 
conclusion, including: class action plaintiffs usually recover only 
worthless coupons, discounts, or products,174 or distribute cy pres 
awards to unrelated charities;175 the cases are horribly inefficient 
and most of the proceeds are said to be eaten up by legal fees or 
claims administration expenses;176 and when the victims do 
recover money, the sums are so small most victims do not even 
find it worthwhile to claim themP7 Noncompensation is said to be 
a special problem for indirect purchasers who, it is asserted, are 
the ones that really suffered most of the losses; direct purchasers, 
by contrast, are portrayed as nonvictims who reap windfalls.l78 
All of the critics who voice these views have one thing in 
common: they provide only unsupported assertions or, at best, 
anecdotes to justify their assertions. None has provided or cited 
reliable empirical data in support of their allegations. We choose 
to respond in some detail to two of these critics because they are 
among the best, most scholarly, and respected individuals who 
173 See Cavanagh, supra note 28, at 214 ("Many class action suits generate substantial 
fees for counsel but produce little, if any, benefit to the alleged victims of the wrongdoing."). 
174 See, e.g., id. (suggesting coupon settlements fail to compensate antitrust victims); John 
E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Indirect Purchaser Suits and the Consumer Interest, 48 
ANTITRUST BULL. 531, 554 (2003) (asserting the low value of vouchers distributed in the 
Microsoft state·court litigation). 
175 See Lopatka & Page, supra note 174, at 554-55 ("[C]ourts often turn to cy pres 
distributions of part or even all of the funds to worthy causes."). 
176 See Crane, supra note 18, at 682-83 ("[l]dentifying the actual people who suffered 
injury and issuing them a check is often so expensive that administrative costs swallow the 
entire recovery."). 
177 See Lopatka & Page, supra note 174, at 554 (contending the low value of vouchers from 
the Microsoft state-court litigation discouraged consumers from seeking to redeem them). 
178 See Cavanagh, supra note 28, at 214 ("Many class action suits generate substantial 
fees for counsel but produce little, if any, benefit to the alleged victims of the wrongdoing. 
Coupon settlements, wherein plaintiffs settle for 'cents off coupons while their attorneys 
are paid their full fees within this category. Coupon settlements may take the form of a 
discount certificate on future purchases from defendants, or, as in the case of airlines, a 
right to discounts on future travel. Coupon settlements are of dubious value to the victims 
of antitrust violations .... Clearly, the types of coupon settlements described here, which 
are not atypical, confer no real benefits on the plaintiffs. Equally important, defendants are 
not forced to disgorge their ill-gotten gains when coupons are not redeemed. In such 
situations, it is difficult to justify paying attorneys their full fees in cash, instead of in 
kind."); William H. Page, Indirect Purchaser Suits Mter the Class Action Fairness Act 3 
(June 10, 2011) (discussing the difficulties of recovering as an indirect purchaser), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.comlsoI3/papers.cfm?abstracCid=186 2218 [hereinafter Page, After the 
Class]; see also Crane, supra note 18, at 682 (asserting a direct purchaser may fully recover 
a monopolist's overcharge even if the cost is passed downstream). 
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have criticized private enforcement. Yet the flaws m their 
criticisms are typical. 
Professor William Page, one of the nation's leading antitrust 
scholars, criticizes private enforcement in a number of articles. To 
be fair, his view is nuanced. He focuses his criticisms on indirect 
purchaser actions under state law, which he claims serve as a poor 
means of compensating victims and an inefficient and excessive 
form of deterrence. He asserts, for example: "[E]ven courts that 
did certify classes [in indirect purchaser actions] found it 
impractical to distribute most of the settlement funds to 
consumers who actually suffered harm, instead relying on dubious 
coupon and cy pres distributions."179 Each of his assertions about 
coupons and cy pres distributions is, of course, sometimes true. 
The key question for public policy purposes, however, is how often 
each is true. For example, do 95% of victorious antitrust class 
action cases "rely" upon "dubious" coupons for victims or cy pres 
awards? Or is the correct figure only 5%? The policy implications 
of these alternatives differ sharply. If his assertions are correct 
95% of the time, then private litigation is not adequately 
compensating the true victims of illegal behavior. 
Yet in support of his assertion that courts are "relying on 
dubious coupon and cy pres distributions," Professor Page cites 
only three cases that he claims involved dubious coupons or 
vouchers. 180 Without going into the specifics of each case and 
whether the coupons were in fact worthwhile or dubious, we have 
no way of knowing whether these cases are typical. What 
percentage of antitrust settlements involve coupons? Why were 
these cases chosen? Moreover, some coupons resulting from 
antitrust cases are worthwhile,181 and a settlement may include 
179 Page, After the Class, supra note 178, at 4; see also id. at 24 ("Even if offered amounts 
are more substantial, most consumers typically do not make claims. In the Microsoft 
litigation, for example, consumers only claimed a small fraction of the settlement amounts 
in the various state settlements. In Massachusetts, 'only 1 percent of $34 million in 
vouchers was claimed.' "). 
lSO See Lopatka & Page, supra note 174, at 552-56 (discussing the Microsoft and Domestic 
Air Transport litigation and citing the Motorsports Merchandising litigation). 
181 See, e.g., In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation, 164 F. Supp. 2d 345 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001), affd, 42 F. App'x 511 (2d Cir. 2002); Kruman v. Christie's International PLC, 284 
F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002). These cases are analyzed in Lande & Davis, Forty Case Studies, 
supra note 16, at 13-18. 
2013] DEFYING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 43 
coupons as only a modest percentage of the total recovery,182 For 
these reasons, the crucial issue for policy purposes is the 
percentage of settlements that "rely" on coupons that are 
"dubious." We lack the needed data and therefore simply have no 
way of knowing whether Professor . Page's anecdotes are 
representative or anomalous. 
Professor Page's cy pres point is similarly unsupported. He 
cites a large number of cases involving cy pres settlements, but 
almost none "relied" on a cy pres award; the cases possibly used cy 
pres awards to dispose of relatively small amounts of residual 
money that could not, as a practical matter, be distributed to the 
victims.183 The only specific dollar amounts he mentioned are one 
award of $50,000 and nine awards of $250,000 each. 184 But he 
does not say what the total amounts of the recoveries in these 
cases were. A $50,000 cy pres grant that is the undistributed 
residual of a $50 million settlement seems hardly worth 
complaining about; what would Professor Page prefer the court do 
with the money?185 He does provide a small number of cases that 
appeared to be "relying" upon a cy pres award, discussing at some 
length the Toys ''R'' Us litigation. 186 But we have no way of 
knowing whether these cases are typical. We cannot tell whether 
cy pres awards generally comprise 1% or 100% of settlement 
funds. We have no idea how representative these cases are; what 
percent of settlements "rely" on cy pres awards? 
More generally, Professor Page writes: "In earlier studies of 
indirect purchaser litigation, I found that this dispersed and 
inefficient system provided little benefit to consumers who actually 
paid an overcharge."187 Professor Page continues: "Even if classes 
are certified, the resulting settlements do little to benefit the 
182 See Lande & Davis, Forty Case Studies, supra note 16, at 13-14 (noting the coupon 
ratio in the Auction Houses settlement was 20%). 
183 See Lopatka & Page, supra note 174, at 554-56 (discussing cases that utilized cy pres 
distribution). 
184 [d. at 554-56, 555 n.94. 
185 See Davis & Lande, Summaries of Twenty Cases of Successful Private Enforcement, 
supra note 16, at 24-26 (discussing the High Pressure Laminates litigation awarding 
plaintiffs $46 million and distributing a residual $41,644.79 as cy pres). Allocating slightly 
less than 0.1 % of the recovery to cy pres hardly seems significant. 
186 See Lopatka & Page, supra note 174, at 554-56. 
187 Page, After the Class, supra note 178, at 3 (citing his earlier article, Lopatka & Page, 
supra note 174 for support). 
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consumers who paid the overcharges."188 For support for these 
assertions he again cites his earlier article.189 
Page's earlier article does support his argument with more than 
assertions or a group of anecdotes of unknown typicality. The 
article cites as support a study of consumer class action cases.l90 
However, the study was published in 1988 and was a general 
study of class action cases, not one dealing specifically with 
antitrust cases.191 The characteristics of antitrust class actions 
might well be different from those of most other consumer class 
action cases. Moreover, a study published twenty-five years ago, 
discussing many cases that even then were not new, provides little 
insight about current antitrust litigation. 
Finally, Page writes: "Even where indirect purchaser classes of 
consumers have been certified and have generated a settlement 
fund, they have provided little compensation to consumers, despite 
incurring significant costs of fund administration."192 He later 
continued: "It is very often impractical to distribute tiny individual 
damage awards to consumers at a reasonable cost."193 For this 
proposition, Page cites one of the Microsoft cases, the Relafen case, 
and Professor Crane.l94 As support for Page's claims about the 
burden of claims administration he does cite actual estimates of 
claims administration expenses in one case, of $7.52 to $292, on a 
per claimant basis.l95 But he never tells us whether these 
amounted to 5% or 50% of the settlement fund. In fact, in Relafen 
the administrative costs were 5.3% of the settlement fund.l 96 
Again, we have no way of knowing whether these figures are 
typical. 
While it surely is true that at times it is not cost-effective to 
return overcharges to every victim of an antitrust violation, 
Professor Page provides no statistics showing that the amounts 
received by the victims in antitrust settlements typically are 
188 Id. at 24. 
189 Id. at 24 n.96. 
190 Lopatka & Page, supra note 174, at 552. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 Page, After the Class, supra note 17S, at 24. 
194 Id. at 24 n.99. The Crane paper referenced can be found at supra note IS. 
195 Lopatka & Page, supra note 174, at 552 n.S5. 
196 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1307 tbl.S. 
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"tiny."197 We do not dispute that they may be tiny on occasion. We 
tried to develop statistics on this point but were able to obtain only 
anecdotal information. We offer as an example the Paxil 
settlement: 61,064 victims received an average of $196.31 each; 
5,784 victims received $500-$1000 each; 1,262 received $1,000-
$2,000 each, and 19 received more than $2,000 each. 198 Another 
interesting example is the Relafen settlement. It produced 978 
refunds to consumer victims of between $1,000 and $2,000, and 
253 refunds of at least $2,000; two distributions to two different 
groups of overcharged victims averaged $592 and $59. Some of 
these refunds were unclaimed, so each victim was subsequently 
sent an additional 23.9% of the amounts in the earlier 
distributions. 199 We are not asserting that these amounts are 
average or typical; we present them merely as illustrations that 
the amounts returned to victims are not always "tiny," and 
because they are symbolic of our challenge to critics to present 
reliable statistics rather than opinions as the basis for their 
conclusions. We would welcome an analysis of a significant group 
of cases. 
Page relies in part upon Professor Crane, another leading 
antitrust scholar, who provides even less support for his sweeping 
claim that "issuing [class members] a check is often so expensive 
that administrative costs swallow the entire recovery."200 As a 
basis for this claim, Crane relies solely on a 1969 Posner article 
that takes a similar position yet similarly offers no empirical 
support for it.201 Crane further argues: "[A]fter lawyers' fees and 
administrative fees are accounted for, each consumer's share of the 
recovery is negligible, even though the harm to the class is 
great."202 One might think Crane would substantiate this 
contention, perhaps relying on empirical research revealing cases 
197 Page, After the Class, supra note 178, at 24. 
198 E-mail from Patrick E. Cafferty, Partner, Cafferty Clobes Meriwether & Sprengel to 
Robert H. Lande, Professor, Univ. of Bait. School of Law (Feb. 14, 2011, 3:20:57 PM ET) (on 
file with author). 
199 Id. 
200 Crane, supra note 18, at 683. 
201 Id. at 683 n.30. 
202 Id. at 683. Crane's remark is probably the conventional wisdom in the antitrust field. 
See also Joel Davidow, International Implications of US Antitrust in the George W. Bush 
Era, 25 WORLD COMPETITION 493, 496 (2002) ("It is frequently alleged that class action 
recoveries for antitrust or other US torts benefit lawyers more than victims."). 
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in which legal fees and claims administration expenses left little 
for injured victims, such as only a few dollars for each victim and 
perhaps only a small portion of the settlement fund for the victims 
on the whole. However, Crane provides no empirical evidence at 
all for his assertions.203 
Crane relies instead on an article by Professor Cavanagh, 
another highly respected scholar.204 Cavanagh's article, in turn, 
adduces only an admixture of anecdotes and hypotheticals 
involving the use of coupons.205 He does not specify the size of any 
actual administrative costs in any cases.206 Nor does he offer any 
data on the size of legal fees or the frequency of coupon 
settlements.207 Neither scholar provides data showing whether 
administrative costs average 50% of the settlements or 5%. 
Neither Crane nor Cavanaugh presents data suggesting the 
average size of the legal fees as a percentage of the class recovery 
or the average portion of the recovery left to compensate the 
victims. Without this information, Crane's assertion that legal 
fees and administrative fees "often ... swallow the entire 
recovery" amounts to no more than speculation.208 The limited 
information we have assembled, moreover, suggests that the 
assertions made by Professors Page and Crane are likely to be 
incorrect. 
As noted above, we were able to ascertain the attorney's fees in 
forty-five of the sixty large private cases we studied. The fees 
averaged either 14.3% or 25.6%, using, respectively, a weighted or 
unweighted average.209 The weighted number is better for gauging 
the total amount of compensation that reached the plaintiffs 
because it gives more weight to the larger settlements, which have 
a lower percentage allocated to attorney's fees. 210 An earlier study 
of seventy-one antitrust class action cases computed slightly lower 
203 See generally Crane, supra note 18, at 683 (alleging that private antitrust enforcement 
fails to compensate victims). 
204 Id. at 683 n.34 (citing Cavanagh, supra note 28, at 214). 
205 See Cavanagh, supra note 28, at 213-15 (discussing criticisms of class action lawsuits). 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Crane, supra note 18, at 683. 
209 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1294-95. 
210 Id. 
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figures: median legal fees of 9.15% and mean legal fees of 
21.02%.211 
We did not report the costs of administering the settlement 
funds when we analyzed the sixty large private cases in our study. 
In general, we found it difficult to convince attorneys or claims 
administrators to spend their valuable time searching for the 
relevant material. We did, however, persuade two claims 
administration firms, Rust Consulting and Class Action & Claims 
Solutions, to assemble and supply relevant data from their cases. 
The resulting information we obtained in these thirty-one cases is 
instructive. The administrative costs in these cases, all of which 
had claim filing deadlines between 2003 and 2010, averaged 4.1% 
of the recoveries and were all less than 10%.212 "These thirty-one 
cases, moreover, were mostly moderate in size: twenty-seven 
involved settlements of $6-$70 million each and the largest was 
$250 million .. · .. "213 There are fixed costs associated with 
returning overcharges to victims, so it would be logical for the 
percentage of administrative costs to be smaller for larger cases 
and to be larger for very small recoveries. 
In regard to this last point, note that we were able to obtain the 
administrative costs involved in returning overcharges to the 
victims in one of the largest antitrust cases in history-the 
Visa/MasterCard case.214 In that case, the administrative fees 
involved with returning more than $3 billion comprised 2.34% of 
the settlement fund. 215 
The total of the legal fees (the low estimate in the two samples 
was 9.15% and the high estimate was 25.6%) plus the 
administrative costs (of 4.1% for the sample of thirty-two cases) 
would be approximately 13% to 30% of the settlements, depending 
211 See id. at 1295 n.99. 
212 See supra Part n.B.1.iii (discussing the allocation of recoveries in our sample). We are 
grateful to Rust Consulting and to Class Action & Claims Solutions for this information. 
213 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1308. Although in many 
respects $6-$70 million is a large settlement, the majority of sixty cases in our study 
involved settlements of more than $100 million, and nine were at least $700 million. ld. at 
1308 n.153. 
214 ld. at 1306. 
215 ld. at 1308. 
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upon which average figures are used.216 This would result in the 
victims receiving 70% to 87% of the settlement.217 
As noted above, we do not claim that these thirty-two cases are 
typical of antitrust class action settlements218 (and we readily 
concede there must have been cases involving substantially higher 
administrative costS).219 At the least, however, we know a number 
of antitrust class action cases returned around 70% to 87% of the 
recovery to victims after subtracting legal fees and claims 
administration expenses. And some cases, like the 
VisalMasterCard case, returned more than 90% to victims.220 Of 
course, it would be ideal to generalize from larger and better 
samples. But note that the critics who claim legal fees and 
administrative expenses "often ... swallow the entire recovery" in 
216 Id. at 1293-95, 1308. 
217 The possibility that Professor Page has made an inaccurate estimate of administrative 
costs in indirect purchaser actions also tends to undermine his claim that they provide a 
highly inefficient means of achieving optimal deterrence. Similarly, the Class Action 
Fairness Act, allowing for greater coordination between indirect purchaser, direct 
purchaser, and competitor claims through removal of most indirect purchaser class actions 
to federal court, supports our position. 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2012). 
218 As we noted elsewhere: 
We asked a large number of potential sources, including both claims 
administration firms and individual attorneys, for the administrative fees 
associated with as many antitrust class action cases as they could produce. 
But the vast [sic] most of the potential sources were too busy or for other 
reasons declined to supply us with this information. We have no way of 
knowing whether those who did supply us with information are typical. 
Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1306 n.152. Moreover, "[e]leven of 
these cases involved payments to indirect purchasers, and these cases averaged 5.6% in 
administrative costs, while the twenty-one direct purchaser cases averaged 3.1%." Id. at 
1310 n.159. "Since the cases were not randomly selected and are few in number, we 
hesitate to come to a strong conclusion that indirect purchaser cases involve higher 
administrative costs .... " Id. Perhaps it would be fair to infer that these results suggest 
that indirect purchaser cases typically involve slightly higher, though still modest, 
administrative costs. That conclusion, however, seems tenuous given the limited sample. 
More research is needed. 
219 We do not know of a specific example. But surely there have been small class action 
cases with extremely high administrative costs and 33% attorney's fees. 
220 As noted, the administrative expenses in this case were 2.34%. The attorney's fees 
were $225.17 million-divided by the total of $3,771.25 million equals 5.97%. Davis & 
Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1309 n.156. "In 2007 we reported legal fees 
in this case of 6.5%. We believe the difference is due to the fact that the settlement earned 
interest before it was distributed. Regardless, the total of legal fees and administrative 
expenses was less than 10%." Id. at 1310 n.161. 
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class actions provide no evidence at all, much less a large data set 
or a representative sample.221 
Crane further asserts that compensation "fails" as a goal of 
antitrust because recoveries do not end up with the real victims of 
the initial overcharges; his basis for this assertion is his claim that 
illegal overcharges pass through various layers in the distribution 
chain rather than remaining with the direct purchasers who are 
the only ones able to bring claims for damages under federal 
antitrust law.222 Crane attempts to substantiate this argument by 
221 Crane, supra note 18, at 682-83. 
222 Id. at 681-82. Similarly, Michael Denger, former Chair of the ABA Antitrust Section, 
stated, "Substantial windfalls go to plaintiffs that are not injured or only minimally injured." 
Michael L. Denger, Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Chair's Showcase Program at the ABA 
Section of Antitrust Law 50th Annual Spring Meeting 3 (Apr. 25, 2002), available at http:// 
Americanbar.orglcontentldamlabalpublishinglantitrust_sourcel07_ 02.authcheckdam.pdf. But 
Mr. Denger provides no data to prove his assertions or any citations to scholarly articles 
containing such data. He does not even provide a single supporting anecdote. Robert H. 
Lande, Potential Benefits from Private Competition Law Enforcement, in PRIvATE 
ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAw 61, 63 (Luis Antonio Velasco San Pedro et aI. eds., 2011) 
(citations omitted). 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, W. Stephen Cannon wrote: 
[PJrivate plaintiffs act in their own self-interest, which may well diverge 
from the public interest. Private plaintiffs are very often competitors of the 
firms they accuse of antitrust violations, and have every incentive to 
challenge and thus deter hard competition that they cannot or will not 
meet. If the legal system were costless and errorless, these incentives 
would pose no problem. However, litigation is expensive and courts and 
juries may erroneously conclude that procompetitive or competitively 
neutral conduct violates the antitrust laws. Under the conditions, private 
plaintiffs will bring suits that should not be brought and that deter 
competitively beneficial conduct. They know that defendants often will be 
willing to offer significant settlements rather than incur substantial 
litigation costs and risks. Since potential defendants know this too, they 
will refrain from engaging in some forms of potentially procompetitive 
conduct in order to avoid the cost and risk of litigation. 
W. Stephen Cannon, The Administration's Antitrust Remedies Reform Proposal: Its 
Derivation and Implications, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 103, 106 (1986). 
Antitrust Modernization Commission Commissioner Jacobson co-authored the 
following observations: 
For the weaker firm suing the stronger firm, the suit may be a way of 
sensitizing the stronger firm so that it will not undertake any aggressive 
actions while the suit is outstanding. If the stronger firm feels itself under 
legal scrutiny, its power may be effectively neutralized. 
For large firms suing smaller firms, private antitrust suits can be veiled 
devices to inflict penalties. Suits force the weaker firm to bear extremely 
high legal costs over a long period of time and also divert its attention from 
competing in the market. Or, following the argument above, a suit can be a 
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relying on a "typical" example: a hypothetical-dominant medical 
equipment manufacturer entering into exclusive contracts with 
hospitals that unlawfully lock out competitors and allow the 
manufacturer to charge a monopoly price. 223 In his hypothetical, 
the distributors originally pay the overcharge, and some-but not 
all-of that overcharge is passed onto the hospitals. The hospital 
also passes along some-but not all-of the overcharge to the 
patients.224 The insurance companies pay the bulk of the 
overcharge because the patients are not often directly affected, as 
they pay only an insurance co-pay.225 
low· risk way of telling the weaker firm that it is attempting to bite off too 
much of the market. The outstanding suit can be left effectively dormant 
through legal maneuvering and selectively activated (inflicting costs on the 
weaker firm) if the weaker firm shows signs of misreading the signal. 
Jonathan M. Jacobson & Tracy Greer, Twenty-one Years of Antitrust Injury: Down the Alley 
with Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 273, 277 (1998) (quoting 
MICHAEL PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 85-86 (1980}). However, these authors do not 
provide systematic data to support their conclusions. 
223 Crane, supra note 18, at 681-82. 
224 Id. 
225 To see why private enforcement fails at compensating for wealth transfer, 
consider the chain of loss-causation in a typical antitrust claim. A 
dominant durable medical equipment manufacturer enters into exclusive 
dealing contracts with hospitals and the group purchasing organizations 
("GPOs") that bargain on the hospitals' behalf. The exclusive contracts 
unlawfully lock out potential competitors and allow the manufacturer to 
charge a monopoly price. In the first instance, the monopoly overcharge is 
paid by distributors that stock goods for the hospitals. The hospitals have 
complex billing arrangements with the distributors in which some, but not 
all, of the overcharge is passed on to the hospital. The hospitals then pass 
along some, but not necessarily all, of this overcharge to their patients. 
The patients are often not directly affected by the overcharge. This is 
because the patients' co-pay for using hospital services remains initially 
unaffected; their insurance companies pay the bulk of the passed-on 
overcharge. The insurance companies may eventually increase their 
premiums or co-pays, but these future increases may fall on a different set 
of insured than those who received monopoly-priced services. For large 
classes of patients such as the indigent and the elderly, any overcharge 
borne by the hospitals may be passed onto taxpayers in the form of 
Medicare, Medicaid, or direct hospital subsidization. This complex scenario 
has countless analogs in the world of manufacturing, sales, and 
distribution. Thus, a monopoly overcharge often produces numerous 
ripples in the economy. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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Professor Crane characterizes his lone hypothetical as 
"typical,"226 but that seems unlikely. It involves monopoly 
exclusion, but most significant private recoveries are based on 
illegal collusion,227 conduct that is usually far simpler to analyze. 
Yet relying on this single exclusive-dealing hypothetical, Crane 
dismisses the more than $12 billion paid to direct purchasers in 
the cases studied in the earlier LandelDavis survey.228 "Since 
direct purchasers often pass along a substantial portion of any 
overcharges downstream, over two thirds of the recoveries studied 
[those involving direct purchasers] likely failed to compensate the 
parties who ultimately absorbed most ofthe economic injury."229 
Crucially, Crane does not analyze the overcharges or the 
recoveries in any of the direct purchaser cases in the LandelDavis 
study. In reality, he does not know what percentage of the 
settlement funds in the Lande/Davis sample actual victims 
received. 
Crane could have analyzed the direct purchaser cases in the 
study he cites. Consider the Auction Houses cases, for example, 
where firms were convicted of conspiring to raise auction 
commission rates.230 We would be extremely interested in the 
results if he to assessed how much of the $552 million recovery231 
ultimately went to people who were victimized by the cartel. We 
expect that, other than 5.2% of the fund allocated to attorney's 
fees,232 almost all went to the real victims of the collusion. Crane 
does not consider the possibility that almost all of the direct 
purchasers could have been end users. We also would urge him to 
analyze the $125 million in coupons issued in that case233 (which 
we conservatively did not count as a cash benefit). He would see 
that these coupons were fully transferable (and were in fact often 
transferred) and fully redeemable for cash if not used for five 
226 Id. at 687. 
227 See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 901 (describing the types of claims made 
in our first case study). 
228 Id. at 899-900 tb1.4. 
229 Crane, supra note 18, at 684. See also Lopatka & Page, supra note 174, at 544 
(suggesting that direct purchasers at times may not be able to pass on overcharges). 
230 See Lande & Davis, Forty Case Studies, supra note 16, at 13-18 (discussing the claims 
and recoveries in these cases). 
231 Id. at 13. 
232 Id. at 14. 
233 Id. at 17. 
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years.234 We would be very interested in whether he (or Professor 
Page) would characterize these coupons as "dubious" and dismiss 
them as being unworthy of consideration as compensation for the 
real victims.235 
Rather than analyze the forty cases in our study (or a different 
group of cases) to determine the percentage of the recoveries that 
went to the actual victims of the antitrust violations, Crane made 
up an extremely complicated exclusion hypothetical, assumed it to 
be "typical," and used it to dismiss the more than $12 billion in our 
study (most of which came from collusion cases) as not having 
compensated the real victims of illegal behavior.236 That seems 
inappropriate. 
To be sure, in some cases a portion of the overcharges to direct 
purchasers is passed on to the next level in the distribution chain. 
But it is also true that direct purchasers often recover in 
settlement only a fraction of the overcharges they pay-an amount 
that does not fully compensate them for their losses.237 Direct 
purchasers in a case, for example, may pass on 50% of an 
overcharge to the next level in the distribution chain, but they may 
recover only 30%-the average amount found by Professor Connor 
in his study of the size of settlements in private cartel cases238--of 
the overcharge as damages. If so, the direct purchasers would 
need the full amount they recovered and then some to be made 
whole.239 
Moreover, Crane ignores another type of harm to direct 
purchasers. It is a basic economic rule that when prices increase, 
output decreases. If direct purchasers are resellers, the lower 
volume reduces their profits. Thus, even if some direct purchasers 
initially appeared to receive excessive compensation as a result of 
an antitrust case, that appearance may well be misleading given 
the lost profits they are unable to recover. 
234 Id. at 18. Twenty percent of the legal fees in this case were in the form of these 
coupons. Id. 
235 Page, supra note 178, at 3. 
236 Crane, supra note 18, at 681-82. 
237 See Connor, supra note 26, at 14-15 (discussing insufficient settlements in cases 
involving international cartels). 
238 Id. 
239 In this hypothetical, the indirect purchaser also paid overcharges but would receive 
nothing in the recovery. 
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For these reasons, Crane's argument at best supports the view 
that it is possible that some of the $12 billion in recoveries received 
by direct purchasers in our case study failed to compensate the 
actual victims of antitrust violations. But it is also possible that 
all of the recoveries provided important-but insufficient-
compensation to victims of antitrust violations. In any case, his 
arguments do not justify discounting all of the payments made to 
direct purchasers. 
Crane offers a similarly flawed analysis of payments made to 
indirect purchasers in the LandelDavis study. He writes: 
[O]ne should also consider the $1.815 billion recovered 
in the six indirect purchaser cases to gauge whether 
these recoveries help to offset the [downstream 
channeling of costs]. [T]he [average recovery per case 
is] skewed by the El Paso litigation, which resulted in 
a $1.4 billion recovery for the indirect 
purchasers .... In each case, the settlement pot was 
further reduced by an attorney's fee award, generally 
in the 20 to 33 percent range.240 
However, in the case Crane primarily analyzes, the El Paso case, 
only 6% of the settlement was allocated to attorney's fees, a fact 
Crane omits.241 
Crane spends some of his analysis on the largest indirect 
purchaser case in our sample, the El Paso case, which yielded $1.4 
billion for indirect purchasers: 
[T]the settlement provided for a complex scheme of 
remittances to the California Public Utilities 
Commission and for natural gas rate reductions over 
fifteen to twenty years .... 
240 Crane, supra note 18, at 685 (footnotes omitted). 
241 Crane also argues that the $1.815 billion in indirect purchaser recoveries should be 
reduced for attorney's fees. Id. at 684. One certainly could justify doing this, but it also 
would make sense to express all values in current dollars. The El Paso settlement was in 
2001, but Crane published his article in 2010. If El Paso's $1.4 billion recovery were 
reduced by 6% for attorney's fees, down to $1.3 billion, but expressed in 2010 dollars, it 
would actually be a higher amount: $1.6 billion. But Crane only advocated performing the 
downward adjustment. Id. 
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One may describe the El Paso scheme as 
compensating consumers as a class, but such a 
description would be largely inaccurate. This is 
because consumer injuries occurring in the past 
correspond only roughly to future consumer gains. 
Injured consumers who died, moved away from 
California, or discontinued natural gas service over the 
rate-reduction period received no compensation, or 
they received compensation that bore little relation to 
the amount of their injury. On the other hand, 
consumers who moved to California or otherwise began 
natural gas consumption after the violation received a 
windfall. In sum, consumers whose consumption 
patterns or volume changed significantly from the time 
of the violation to the rate-reduction period were either 
overcompensated or undercompensated. The El Paso 
settlement did not amount to a serious effort to 
identify persons who suffered economic harm and 
compensate them in proportion to their 10ss.242 
Crane ignores crucial facts, however, including those set forth 
in our eleven-page analysis of the case that he cites four times.243 
He fails to acknowledge that the settlement included $551 million 
in upfront cash and stock valued at market rates.244 Surely 
upfront payments to consumers did a wonderful job of 
compensating the actual victims. Moreover, our analysis of this 
case noted that we did not count the settlement's $125 million in 
future rate reductions on electricity as a benefit from the case.245 
242 Id. at 685-86. 
243 Compare id. (discussing El Paso), with Lande & Davis, Forty Case Studies, supra note 
16, at 77-88 (detailing distinctive aspects of the El Paso settlement). 
244 See Lande & Davis, Forth Case Studies, supra note 16, at 77 ("The settlement 
consideration consisted of more than 1.552 billion, including $551 million in upfront cash 
and stock valued at market rates .... "). See generally Crane, supra note 18. 
245 Lande & Davis, Forty Case Studies, supra note 16, at 77. The general policy of the 
Landeillavis study was to be (perhaps overly) conservative by not counting the 
compensatory effects of products, coupons (which were part of In re Auction Houses), 
discounts, or rate reductions. Due to our omissions, our study was providing only a lower 
bound on the compensation effects of these cases. If Crane is fairly going to argue that 
these cases have not meaningfully compensated victims, as opposed to only calculating a 
lower bound on the benefits of these cases, he should have included these omissions back 
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Somewhat more difficult to analyze are the $876 million in cash 
payments that were to be made to victims in the future. 246 One 
would not expect a perfect correspondence between the 13 million 
California consumers and 3,000 businesses overcharged by EI Paso 
and the future beneficiaries of the settlement.247 But if one 
assumes an efficient market, as economists are wont to do, a 
consumer who sells her home soon after the settlement was inked 
should benefit from an increased sales price, because the 
purchaser of the house will be receiving a share of the 
settlement.248 In other words, an owner selling her house after the 
settlement should have reaped the capitalized value of the 
settlement.249 
Of course, markets are not always efficient. We, therefore, do 
not know, for example, how many California residents left the 
state after they collected only five years of cash payments.250 But 
neither does Crane.251 He relies on an imperfect correspondence 
between the overcharge and the recovery to dismiss the entire $1.4 
billion settlement, saying that it would be "largely inaccurate" to 
say that the settlement compensated the victims.252 Crane has not 
given us any information on which to take such a strong 
position.253 
Another analytic strategy that Crane adopts causes him to 
underestimate the value of the compensation provided by private 
antitrust enforcement.254 He argues that "[e]conomists and 
antitrust scholars increasingly view static consumer injuries as far 
into the analysis to the extent they were valuable to the victims (as was true in In re 
Auction Houses). He cannot fairly conclude that private litigation provides no meaningful 
compensation without fairly analyzing the effects of products, coupons, and discounts to the 
extent they were significant. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
248 See Lande & Davis, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1314 ("But even if a 
consumer sells her home soon after the settlement was inked, to the extent the market was 
efficient-which economists so often assume-the value of the house should have increased 




252 Crane, supra note 18, at 685; see also Davis. & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra 
note 16, at 1314 (discussing this weakness in Crane's argument). 
253 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1314. 
254 [d. at 1315. 
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less significant than dynamic injuries."255 In other words, he 
claims that scholarly commentators are more concerned "with the 
tendency of antitrust violations to stifle innovation than they are 
with its tendency to increase the prices consumers must pay for 
existing goods."256 Crane relies on this assertion and criticizes 
antitrust laws for focusing on static injuries-for example, the 
paying of overcharges-rather than on dynamic injuries-such as 
a loss of access to new products.257 
Of course, this criticism applies to antitrust law generally, not 
just to private enforcement. Moreover, Crane here mixes apples 
and oranges. The prevailing view among scholars has long been 
that antitrust doctrine should focus primarily-if not exclusively-
on creating efficient incentives, not compensating victims.258 
Crane cites Hovenkamp's statement that innovation and 
technological progress contribute more to "economic growth" than 
does achieving the right level of static efficiency.259 This view of 
law as serving to create ideal incentives rather than to redress 
past wrongs reflects the ascendancy of an economic analysis of law 
in antitrust.26o "For these commentators, compensating victims is 
just a means to an end, not an end in itself."261 They have not 
developed a theory-in fact, have not tried to develop a theory-
about the hierarchy of injuries that deserve compensation, just a 
hierarchy among the harms that should be prevented.262 
255 Crane, supra note 18, at 688. 
256 Lande & Davis, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1315. 
257 Id.; see Crane, supra note 18, at 689 (contending few antitrust plaintiffs seek 
compensation for dynamic injuries). 
258 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (4th ed. 1992) 
(discussing the purposes of antitrust law). The authors of this Article believe that an 
important purpose of the antitrust laws is to compensate victims, but we acknowledge that 
this position does not predominate among antitrust scholars. 
259 Lande & Davis, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1315; see Crane, supra note 
18, at 688 n.62 (citing Hovenkamp's assertion that no one doubts Robert M. Solow's ''basic 
conclusion that innovation and technological progress very likely contribute much more to 
economic growth than policy pressures that drive investment and output toward the 
competitive level") (citing Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 247,253 (2007}). 
260 Lande & Davis, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1315. 
261 Id. 
262 See Crane, supra note 18, at 703 (''Rather than looking backwards toward remediating 
or punishing past bad acts, private antitrust enforcement should be oriented toward the 
future by preventing exercises of market power that harm consumers."). 
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Thus, Crane's argument about static and dynamic injuries 
improperly imports views about incentives-and deterrence-into 
a discussion about compensation.263 As we said before: 
Crane offers no reason why a consumer suffers any 
lesser injury from paying an extra $1,000 for a good 
than from being deprived of an opportunity to buy a 
superior good that would be worth an additional 
$1,000 to her. Considered prospectively-viewed in 
terms of economic growth-innovation is much more 
important than static efficiency, but this does not 
mean as a matter of retributive justice $1,000 worth of 
one sort of harm is any more significant than $1,000 of 
another sort of harm. To the contrary, economists 
assume that harms that can properly be measured at 
$1,000 are of precisely equal value to a victim, 
whatever that $1,000 represents.264 
Indeed, that assumption is crucial for an economic analysis to 
function, and if Professor Crane has a different view he should 
present it.265 
As we note above, we have identified sixty private cases that 
returned more than $30 billion in cash to victims of 
anticompetitive behavior, plus additional amounts in coupons, 
discounts, and products.266 That massive recovery should create a 
presumption that a significant number of victims have enjoyed 
substantial compensation as a result of private litigation.267 
Critics of private antitrust enforcement can plausibly argue that 
some of this $30 billion in recoveries might not have compensated 
the actual victims of antitrust violations. We agree with that 
qualification.268 But no critic has shown that this has happened to 
a predominant extent. 269 Yet such a showing would be necessary 
263 Lande & Davis, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1315. 
264 Id. (citing POSNER, supra note 258, at 23). 
265 Id. at 1315-16. 
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before he fairly could dismiss the compensation effects of private 
litigation.270 
Private litigation is virtually the only way to secure recompense 
for the victims of antitrust violations.271 Sadly, we readily 
acknowledge that this $30 billion almost certainly did not 
adequately compensate the victims for the harm they suffered. 
Indeed, we believe that the harm was much larger, but due to 
issues such as overly strict class action certification standards, 
victims were often insufficiently compensated or were completely 
denied compensation.272 But even though a careful empirical 
study found that victims were compensated a median of only 30% 
of their losses273-they sometimes were compensated nearly 100% 
but on many occasions received very little compensation because 
plaintiffs faced problems such as certifying many of the victims in 
a class-we contend that 30% of a loaf is better than none at all. 
The overwhelming weight of the evidence, then, supports the 
view that private antitrust cases have provided large amounts of 
compensation to the victims of antitrust violations. But that does 
not mean victims receive enough. Instead the antitrust laws 
severely undercompensate the victims of antitrust violations.274 
This problem-and not the possibility that some cases result in 
dubious coupons, that legal fees and administrative costs 
"swallow" the recovery, or that there is not a precise enough 
overlap between the real victims and those who recover-should be 
the focus of our concern. 
B. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT DOES NOT DETER FUTURE VIOLATIONS 
As discussed above, we have shown that private antitrust 
enforcement does a great deal to deter anticompetitive conduct, 
likely more than the justly lauded DOJ anti-cartel program.275 
Even treating $6 million of corporate liability as equivalent to a 
year in prison and $3 million as equivalent to a year of house 
270 Id. 
271 For the relatively unusual exceptions, see supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
272 See Connor, supra note 26, at 14 (finding that victims receive a median of only 30% of 
single damages in settlement). 
273 Id. 
274 Id. 
275 See supra Part n.B.3 (comparing private enforcement with the DOJ anti-cartel program). 
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arrest276-and ignoring that defendants were required to provide 
products, discounts, or coupons, pay attorney's fees and other 
litigation costs (including expert witness fees), suffer the 
disruptive effects of the litigation on corporate efficiency, and 
abide by injunctive relief-DOJ anti-cartel cases amount to the 
equivalent of only $11.7 billion in deterrence compared to the $34-
$36 billion in sanctions imposed by private enforcement.277 Only if 
a year in prison were equated to more than $40 million would DOJ 
cartel enforcement do as much to deter as private enforcement.278 
Professor Crane argues, however, that private enforcement does 
not deter anticompetitive actions for an interesting reason: "Two 
converging trends-the increasing length of antitrust proceedings 
and the increasing shortness of managerial tenure-make it likely 
that corporate managers severely discount the threat of future 
litigation damages."279 
Crane first states that antitrust cases have grown lengthier in 
recent years,280 an assertion contradicted by recent data.281 He 
then notes that "the average antitrust suit almost certainly lasts 
several years."282 He then speculates, without evidence, that "in 
the average private antitrust case, the time from the beginning of 
an anticompetitive scheme until judgment day is at least five years 
and may be closer to ten years or more."283 Although this range 
may be accurate due to the lengthy existence of many cartels, it is 
not very important. Each decision a cartel manager makes to 
continue his or her participation in a cartel is a new decision. The 
crucial time lags are the ones from each cartel decision until 
judgment. Recent data suggests only a three-year length for 
276 See Davis & Lande, supra note 16, at 1277 (assigning a dollar value to prison time and 
house arrest). 
277 See id. at 1278 (noting this shortfall in the DOJ's enforcement program). 
278 [d. 
279 Crane, supra note 18, at 691. 
280 [d. at 692 (discussing the burden of discovery on modern litigation). 
281 Professor Connor reports: 
Although time'consuming, settlements in international cartel cases appear 
to be taking shorter times to resolve in recent years .... Prior to 1990, the 
average treble damages case took 11 years between the filing date and the 
date the first firm settled. In the 1990s, that lag dropped to a little more 
than five years, and in the early 2000s it was merely 3 years. 
Connor, supra note 26, at 8. 
282 Crane, supra note 18, at 692. 
283 [d. at 692-93. 
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international cartel litigation and about four years for domestic 
cartel litigation,284 so the lag from the last decisions to enter 
cartels until judgment could be less than four years.285 
Second, he argues: 
This time lag should be paired with the fact that the 
managers who put into place anticompetitive schemes 
are increasingly unlikely to be around to internalize 
their effects at judgment day. During the 1980s, the 
turnover rate among senior managers in large 
corporations was just above ten percent. By all 
accounts, the turnover rate increased significantly-
perhaps even doubling-in the 1990s and 2000s as 
various capital market factors accentuated 
shareholder demand for short-term performance. 
Today, the average CEO holds her job for about six 
years. Mid-level executives, such as divisional 
managers, typically hold their jobs for an even shorter 
period, perhaps less than four years. Thus, most of the 
executives responsible for an antitrust violation will no 
longer be with the firm by the time a damages award 
is entered against the company.286 
Professor Crane's concluding sentence is, however, unsupported 
by his evidence. He ignores the fact that executives often change 
to a different job at the same firm. Even if they change jobs on 
average every four years, they might well remain at the same 
company for a very long period. He also ignores the possibility 
that firms that fix prices might be different on average from other 
corpora tions. 
One of the authors, moreover, recently designed a modest study 
of managerial turnover among executives who violated the 
antitrust laws-albeit a very rough study carried out by a student 
284 Connor, supra note 26, at 8, 12. 
285 The time lag would be three years if the international cartel ended the instant it was 
detected, because private suits are usually filed very shortly after a cartel is detected. The 
period could be longer if the cartel collapsed on its own and was only detected subsequently, 
or if detection occurred well after the last decision to participate. 
286 Crane, supra note 18, at 693-94 (footnotes omitted). 
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research assistant and not a private investigator.287 The study 
was able to determine the 2011 whereabouts of 35 of 103 managers 
(34%) known to have received a prison sentence in a cartel case 
between 1995 and 2010.288 Of those thirty-five, nine (26%) were 
employed in 2010 by the company for which they worked during 
the cartel, and another nine (26%) were working at a different 
company within the same industry.289 The remaining seventeen 
were either still in prison, unemployed, employed in different 
industries, retired, or deceased.29o "Because we were unable to 
discover the whereabouts of 68 of the 103 who received a prison 
sentence, these results might not be statistically significant."291 
Nevertheless, if the employment results for the convicted price 
fixers we were unable to track down are similar to those we could 
find, then half of those who served time in prison for an antitrust 
offense went back to work for their previous employer or another 
firm in the same industry.292 
We also discovered the 2011 whereabouts of four individuals 
who received only fines and no prison sentences.293 Two were 
employed by the same company for which they worked when the 
cartel operated, one appeared to be working in the same industry, 
and the fourth had moved to a new industry.294 
Moreover, for executives who went to prison, our figure of 52% 
almost certainly significantly underestimates the percentage of 
price fixers who went back to the same firm or industry. Some 
287 See Connor & Lande, supra note 137, at 440-42 (discussing a study of known antitrust 
law violators' current whereabouts). This study was conducted between July 15, 2010, and 
March 26, 2011, by W. James Denvil, a student at the University of Baltimore School of 
Law. For the study methodology, see id. at 440 nAB. We stress that Mr. Denvil is not a 
trained private investigator and was only able to access publically available information. 
288 Id. at 441. 
In several cases, individuals were sanctioned but not their very small 
businesses. Thus, we excluded individuals who were stamp dealers, 
consultants, sole proprietors, or co-owners during the cartel. Many of the 
152 defendants' sentencing details are not posted on the Antitrust 
Division's Web site. We thank the Division for providing the missing 
sentencing documents. 
Id. at 441 n.57. 




293 Id. at 442. 
294 Id. 
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individuals likely reached retirement age or returned to a firm or 
industry without notice of this fact being published in a source 
that is easily web-accessible, or the notice of their re-employment 
may have been deleted from the Internet before our highly 
imperfect search. Our survey may have erroneously counted such 
people as not having returned to their firm or industry. 
Thus, Professor Crane's speculation about managerial turnover 
among antirust violators is probably inaccurate. In any case, it 
should not be accepted without evidence. 
Even if his conclusions were backed with sound data, we would 
still have to turn to the next step in his chain of inferences. Crane 
writes: 
High managerial turnover rates might not thwart 
the deterrence objective if managers were to 
internalize some of the detrimental effects of antitrust 
judgments rendered after they leave the defendant 
firm. In particular, managers might incur a 
reputational cost in lost future employment 
opportunities or take a prestige hit in the business 
community by virtue of their past roles in a later-
adjudicated antitrust violation. But there is scant 
evidence suggesting that individual managers' 
reputations are much affected by antitrust judgments 
against their former employers.295 
One might just as easily come to the opposite conclusion: there 
is equally scant evidence that individual managers' reputations 
are not affected by antitrust judgments caused by their conduct. 
Indeed, we know of no sound empirical evidence one way or the 
other. Nevertheless, we would be surprised if a new employer did 
not usually surmise that, for example, the head of the marketing 
department of a firm convicted of price fixing might well have been 
responsible for the price fixing, even if the executive escaped 
sentencing. (Whether the new employer would care is a different 
matter. In light of the unduly low current level of antitrust 
295 Crane, supra note 18, at 694 (footnote omitted). 
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sanctions,296 future employers might not care very much whether 
their executives were likely to fix prices!) Once again, Crane has 
pointed out that something is possible, then assumed it is common, 
and finally derived conclusions based upon this bed of quicksand. 
Crane further argues: 
A second way that private antitrust lawsuits could 
provide an early deterrent shock· is through large 
settlement payouts .... [L]arge settlement payouts in 
private cases usually do not occur until the eve of 
trial. ... [T]he average time from the planning of 
anticompetitive conduct to the payment of any 
substantial settlement amount still probably exceeds 
five years.297 
The filing of a private case can be an extremely important 
event, however, even if everyone involved knows the case will last 
for many years. When a private case is filed, and especially if the 
private suit follows the filing of a government suit, knowledgeable 
observers should have a rough idea a reasonable percentage of the 
time as to whether the firm is likely to be found liable if the 
market is working efficiently. The market certainly could not 
determine the precise discounted present value of a suit that 
might settle for $1-$2 billion in five years. But firms in the field 
observing the events transpiring certainly can decide there is a 
good chance that certain managers probably were responsible for a 
violation likely to cost their company a significant amount of 
money.298 
Crane recognizes that the date of the resolution of litigation 
may not matter for deterrence effects if the filing of a lawsuit itself 
imposes a sufficiently large penalty. His response is that private 
enforcement actions have a much smaller impact on share price 
296 Connor & Lande, supra note 137, at 428 (noting antitrust sanctions are so low they 
should be quintupled). 
297 Crane, supra note 18, at 696. 
298 This assumes that the current sanctions are large enough to matter significantly. But 
see Connor & Lande, supra note 137, at 428 (noting that the current level of cartel sanctions 
is only 90/0-21% of optimality). Firms, then, sometimes might not care that certain 
managers caused their employer to violate the antitrust laws. 
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than government actions. Concerning suits by the government, 
Crane argues: 
While empirical work suggests that the filing of an 
antitrust action by the Department of Justice or 
Federal Trade Commission has an immediate and 
significant negative effect on a defendant firm's share 
price, the filing of a private antitrust lawsuit has only 
about a tenth of the effect of a public suit. Empirical 
studies have found that defendants lost, on average, 6 
percent of their share value upon the filing of a 
government antitrust lawsuit, but only about 0.6 
percent of their share value upon the filing of a private 
lawsuit. A half-percent drop in market capitalization 
is unlikely to engender ruinous consequences to most 
managers, particularly if the gams from the 
challenged behavior were large.299 
Crane's dismissal of the effect of private antitrust enforcement 
on stock prices is unpersuasive for the two reasons discussed 
above: first, a decrease in share prices of 0.6 % is quite significant; 
second, the drop in price when the government files a case is likely 
largely the result of the market anticipating a later private action 
and the large costs it may impose on a corporate defendant rather 
than the much smaller sanctions, if any, the government is likely 
to impose on the corporation (as opposed to its officers and 
directors).300 
Further, Crane's comparison of the drop in share value from 
public and private enforcement may reflect selection bias. 
Government prosecutors appear to be risk averse, pursuing only 
the strongest cases.30l Our study of DOJ criminal enforcement, for 
example, showed a rate of success of over 90%.302 Plaintiffs' 
attorneys, on the other hand, are willing to take greater chances. 
This difference in attitude partially explains why the ratio of 
299 Crane, supra note 18, at 695. 
300 See supra Part ILB.4 (discussing the drop in stock price after antitrust actions are 
flled). 
301 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing the heightened criteria required 
for a government lawsuit). 
302 Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence, supra note 16, at 337. 
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private cases to public cases was six to one for most of the 
twentieth century and by the 1980s had climbed to ten to one. 303 
Thus, private plaintiffs file lawsuits in almost every action that 
the government files a case, but the opposite is not true.304 As a 
result, the larger decrease in share value from government filings 
than private filings may reflect the relative strength of the cases 
at issue, and not just the relative impact of a government action as 
compared to a private action.305 
Like Professor Crane's compensation argument, his deterrence 
argument consists only of theoretical chains of inferences built 
upon inferences, each a possibility as to what could happen to 
some extent and many of them implausible upon reflection. We 
have shown that defendants paid more than $33 billion in cash as 
a result of just sixty private antitrust cases.306 These same 
defendants also spent additional sums on discounts, products, 
coupons, rate reductions, and litigation costS.307 Their business 
operations were to some extent disrupted by antitrust lawsuits, 
and the efficiency of many of their officials presumably impaired 
during their pendency. The filing of a private lawsuit also causes 
an immediate and significant drop in share value, and the prospect 
of such a filing likely explains in substantial part why the filing of 
a government action causes such a large drop in share value. We 
cannot show an objective measure of the strength of the deterrence 
effects of private enforcement, but our conclusion that it is 
303 Bizjak & Coles, supra note 113, at 436. 
304 See supra Parts II.B.4--5 (discussing when private suits are filed). 
305 Investors may respond differently to government and private lawsuits for various 
reasons. Government lawsuits may, for example, tend to involve the kind of conduct that is 
most obviously anticompetitive and therefore illegal, such as horizontal agreements that 
allegedly violate the Sherman Act. See Bizjak & Coles, supra note 113, at 437, 442-46 
(arguing that antitrust cases that allege horizontal violations or are brought under the 
Clayton Act result in a greater decrease in share value than cases that, respectively, allege 
vertical violations or are brought under the Sherman Act). In addition, the market may 
respond differently to government filing than private filings in recognition that government 
will file cases only where there is a very high probability of success. See supra note 302 and 
accompanying text. Whether this is a reason to prefer government enforcement to the 
exclusion of private enforcement depends on whether it is desirable to deter only the most 
blatant violations of the antitrust laws. But the different market reactions do not establish 
the relative deterrence effects of public and private enforcement given the same underlying 
conduct. 
306 See discussion supra Part ILB.1.i. 
307 See, e.g., supra note 181 (providing an example of a meaningful coupon distribution); 
supra note 185 (providing an example of a cy pres distribution). 
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extremely significant IS not undermined by Professor Crane's 
criticisms. 
C. PRIVATE CASES USUALLY DO NOT INVOLVE ANTI COMPETITIVE 
CONDUCT308 
Another widespread criticism of private enforcement is that the 
underlying cases lack merit. If Commissioner Rosch were correct 
that "[t]he plaintiffs' lawyers ... stand to win almost regardless of 
the merits of the case,"309 then not only would private antitrust 
actions fail to deter anticompetitive behavior, but they also would 
unfairly over-reward alleged victims while costing innocent 
defendants billions of dollars. Another consequence would be 
discouraging legal-and beneficial-conduct.310 Defendants and 
analysts friendly to defendants often make these assertions and 
provide anecdotes-but no data31l-to establish that recoveries in 
meritless cases occur.312 Just as predictably, plaintiffs dispute 
308 This section is in part based upon and updates material found in Lande & Davis, 
Comparative Deterrence, supra note 16, pt. IV. 
309 Rosch, supra note 147, at 9-10; see also Q&A With Weil Gotshal's Steven A. Newborn, 
supra note 168 ("Class actions ... are increasingly beneficial only to plaintiffs' law firms."). 
Similarly, Professor Herbert Hovenkamp writes that treble damages and attorney's fees for 
victorious plaintiffs give plaintiffs too great an incentive to sue: "As a result many marginal 
and even frivolous antitrust cases are filed every year, and antitrust litigation is often used as 
a bargaining chip to strengthen the hands of plaintiffs who really have other complaints." 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 59 (2005). 
Professor Hovenkamp does not, however, give data that supports his conclusions. Id. 
310 See Jacobson & Greer, supra note 222, at 277 (suggesting that one business strategy is to 
commence antitrust litigation to halt a competitor's growth). However, Jacobson and Greer do 
not provide systematic data to establish the prevalence of this business strategy. Id. 
311 One prominent critic, former ABA Antitrust Section Chair Jan McDavid, candidly 
admitted this lack of data. She conceded, "[The) issue [of class action abuse) was never 
directly presented in these cases, but many of these issues arise in the context of class 
actions in which the potential for abusive litigation is really pretty extraordinary." Janet 
McDavid, Partner, Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., Roundtable Discussion: Antitrust and the 
Roberts Court, 22 ANTITRUST 8, 12-13 (2007) [hereinafter Roundtable Discussion). 
Professor Andrew Gavil then asked McDavid and other lawyers participating in the 
discussion, "What empirical bases do you have for any of those assumptions, other than 
your personal experiences largely as defense lawyers?" Andrew 1. Gavil, Professor, Howard 
Univ. Sch. of Law, Roundtable Discussion, at 13. McDavid replied, "I'm not aware of 
empirical data on any of those issues. My empirical data are derived from cases in which 
I'm involved." McDavid, Roundtable Discussion, at 13. A professor at Columbia Law 
School, C. Scott Hemphill, added, "The Court's attention to false positives relies upon a 
somewhat older theoretical literature. I'm not aware of a sizeable empirical literature 
making the point." C. Scott Hemphill, Columbia Law Sch., Roundtable Discussion, at 13. 
312 See, e.g., Gary D. Ansel, Admonishing a Drunken Man: Class Action Reform, 48 
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that they do. Is there any way to ascertain whether there is any 
truth to these assertions other than through lengthy and 
controversial analyses of a random sample of cases? We believe 
there are several reasons to infer that these concerns are at least 
unproven and in fact likely lack support. 
We know of no study providing evidence that any significant 
number of cases lacked merit and yet recovered substantial 
settlement recoveries. In contrast, as noted above, we have now 
identified sixty cases that appear on the whole to have had 
significant merit. Critics of private antitrust enforcement should 
be required to provide some similarly credible evidence to 
substantiate their position. But they have not done so. No less 
august a political body than the U.S. Supreme Court in Twombly 
has declared that defendants in antitrust cases sometimes settle 
meritless cases. 313 Yet the Court relied not on evidence, not on a 
surveyor study, but rather on the unsupported opinion of another 
appellate court judge.314 Based on little more than conjecture, 
then, the Court made it more difficult for complaints to survive a 
motion to dismiss.315 
Two assumptions tend to underlie the claim that antitrust 
defendants at times settle cases for more than the merits make 
appropriate. First, there is the claim that defendants in class 
actions in general-and in antitrust class actions in particular-
are risk averse and are willing to pay a premium to avoid the 
possibility of losing at trial. 316 Second, there is the suggestion that 
ANTITRUST BULL. 451, 454-56 (2003) (relying on war stories and hearsay yet providing no 
examples of frivolous lawsuits). See generally R. Preston McMee & Nicholas V. Vakkur, 
The Strategic Abuse of the Antitrust Laws, 2 J. STRATEGIC MGMT. EDUC. 37 (2005) (alleging 
strategic uses of antitrust laws, inter alia, to extort funds from a rival, to prevent a 
successful firm from competing, and to respond to existing lawsuits). 
313 Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). 
314 Id. (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Comment, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 
638 (1989». The Supreme Court ignored a trial court judge offering a conflicting opinion as 
part of the same symposium. See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Comment, What Discovery 
Abuse? A Comment on John Setear's The Barrister and the Bomb, 69 B.U. L. REV. 649 
(1989) (arguing federal judges have several methods at their disposal to corral discovery 
abuse). 
315 Twombly, 550 U.S. 569-70 (requiring facts enough to state a claim that relief is 
plausible). 
316 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw 275 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the possibility of 
risk averse defendants settling weak lawsuits); see also supra note 148 and accompanying 
text. 
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antitrust defendants pay significantly higher litigation costs than 
antitrust plaintiffs, placing the defendants at a disadvantage in 
settlement negotiations.317 Relying on these assumptions, in 
theory defendants in antitrust class actions should feel compelled 
to settle even meritless cases. 
Attention to the realities of antitrust litigation belies this view. 
Indeed, for various reasons, the opposite is likely true-plaintiffs 
in private antitrust cases probably settle for too little rather than 
for too much.318 To support this claim, a baseline is useful. 
Relying on a legal positivist perspective, one might treat the 
expected value of litigation as a settlement that reflects the merits 
of a claim.319 The issue, then, is whether one would expect 
defendants in antitrust class actions to settle for less or more than 
the expected value of litigation. 
Defendants in antitrust cases tend to be very wealthy and 
powerful,320 Mter all, violators of the antitrust laws must have 
market power for their illegal conduct to harm others.321 Their 
wealth allows them to retain effective counsel, pay the costs of 
litigation, and tolerate risk. Moreover, plaintiffs are not entitled 
to prejudgment interest.322 As a result, antitrust defendants 
usually enjoy an involuntary, interest-free loan during the 
pendency of litigation. This makes them less eager to settle than 
plaintiffs. In addition, there is evidence that plaintiffs in large 
cases actually incur higher litigation costs than defendants.323 
This may well be true in antitrust class actions, where plaintiffs 
must pay economic experts to gather data and analyze an industry 
317 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (discussing the possibility of cost-conscious defendants 
settling lawsuits but ignoring the possibility that cost-conscious plaintiffs may refrain from 
filing a lawsuit in the face of high discovery costs). 
318 See supra Part II.c. 
319 Joshua Davis, Expected Value Arbitration, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 47, 48 (2004). 
320 See supra note 161. 
321 Although market power is not an element of a per se claim, plaintiffs must prove 
causation and the fact of damage to recover. Davis & Cramer, supra note 161, at 983. 
Defendants, by definition, must have market power to cause antitrust injuries. Fed. Trade 
Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986) (noting point of inquiry into 
market power is to determine whether defendant can cause antitrust harm). 
322 The statute provides for an exception if the defendant causes undue delays or 
otherwise violates the rules. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012). We are not aware of this ever being 
done in an antitrust case. Certainly, it is not common. 
323 Willging et aI., supra note 164, at 548 (finding that at the 95th percentile, based on the 
cost of litigation, plaintiffs pay more in litigation costs than defendants). 
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without the internal expertise, knowledge, and information that 
defendants enjoy. 
The plaintiffs in antitrust litigation, in contrast, tend to have 
limited means.324 By their nature, they generally lack market 
power and are vulnerable to the market manipulations of others. 
Of course, at least in class actions, the right focus may not be on 
the plaintiffs themselves but on their attorneys. But that shift in 
focus reinforces the likelihood that antitrust settlements are likely 
to be too low rather than too high. 
Consider the distinctive incentives before the attorneys for 
defendants and plaintiffs in class actions. Defense attorneys tend 
to be paid by the hour.325 The longer litigation persists, the better 
they are apt to do financially. The Supreme Court and lower 
courts in recent years have also greatly strengthened the hand of 
defense counsel, making it easier for them to prevail in moving to 
dismiss and for summary judgment, and in opposing class 
certification.326 Moreover, defense counsel themselves may not be 
overly averse to risk. They have no direct stake in the outcome of 
trial and, given the extraordinarily high rate of settlement in class 
action cases, likely feel comfortable they can settle eventually if 
their pre-trial efforts prove unsuccessful. 
Plaintiffs' counsel in antitrust cases, on the other hand, 
generally proceed on a contingent basis, spending their time 
without immediate payment and incurring litigation costs on 
behalf of their clients.327 They receive no compensation or 
reimbursement if they lose. They also tend to fare best financially 
if they settle quickly, even for a relatively modest amount.328 
None of this is meant to impugn the ethics or integrity of 
attorneys representing either defendants or plaintiffs in antitrust 
cases. No doubt many attorneys abide by their ethical obligation 
to place their clients' interests above their own. The point is only 
that to the extent that the incentives before the attorneys 
influence the settlement process-even if only at the margins-
they will magnify the negotiation advantages of antitrust 
324 See supra note 162. 
325 See supra note 167. 
326 See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text. 
327 Davis & Cramer, supra note 4, at 371-72. 
328 Id. 
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defendants over antitrust plaintiffs. Plaintiffs in antitrust class 
actions therefore are likely to settle for too little rather than too 
much.329 As a result, the substantial settlements we have 
identified almost certainly reflect claims against behavior that is 
likely anticompetitive, and the same is true for other private cases 
that settle for nontrivial amounts. 
D. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OVERDETERS ANTI COMPETITIVE 
CONDUCT AND THEREBY DETERS BENEFICIAL CONDUCT 
Even if most of the claims in private cases are meritorious, 
many believe that treble damages, especially in light of the other 
existing antitrust sanctions, lead to overdeterrence. The 
conventional wisdom in the field was eloquently articulated by 
Professors Lopatka and Page even before the criminal fine levels 
were significantly increased in 2004:330 
[W]e are skeptical that the sum of all federal penalties 
for illegal antitrust overcharges is suboptimal. Civil 
liability in the form of treble damages is not the only 
penalty for price fixing. Criminal antitrust penalties 
are available and, as we noted earlier, actually precede 
a high percentage of indirect purchaser actions. Even 
setting imprisonment aside, the federal criminal 
penalties are substantiaL... The fines to which 
antitrust defendants have agreed in order to settle 
329 Others may also say that defendants worry that they will lose when they should not. 
This raises a jurisprudential issue. If the courts say conduct violates the antitrust laws, 
and if an appellate court, or even the Supreme Court, confirms liability, is it meaningful to 
say that the outcome is wrong? For present purposes, at least as a first approximation, we 
adopt the simplistic version of the positivist's view and suggest that the law is whatever the 
ultimate court declares it to be. See Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, in 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAw AND LEGAL THEORY 117, 117 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2003) ("[T]he naive 
version of legal realism maintains that the law of a community is constituted by the official 
pronouncements of judges."). Any other perspective would make an objective assessment of 
merit difficult, if not impossible. 
330 In 2004, the Bush Administration proposed and helped enact significant increases in 
the criminal fines against cartels. Standards Development Organization Advancement Act 
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, § 215, 118 Stat. 661, 668 (2004) (substituting a $100,000,000 
maximum corporate fine for the existing $10,000,000 maximum; a maximum $1,000,000 
individual fine for the existing $350,000 maximum; and a maximum ten year prison 
sentence for the existing maximum three year sentence). 
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criminal price-fixing indictments have skyrocketed in 
recent years .... 
It seems likely that the combination of federal 
penalties is adequate.33l 
71 
Others believe there was overdeterrence even before the 2004 
increases,332 and certainly afterwards. 333 Those who believe in 
overdeterrence frequently single out the private treble damages 
remedy for special criticism, believing it contributes significantly 
to a current overdeterrence problem.334 
331 See Lopatka & Page, supra note 174, at 567-68 ("In light of a more expansive corporate 
amnesty policy that increases the probability of uncovering concealable antitrust violations, 
and hence reduces the magnitude of the appropriate fine, the ceilings today may well be 
high enough that the optimal penalty can be imposed through criminal sanctions alone."). 
332 See Bruce H. Kobayashi, Antitrust, Agency, and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the 
Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
715, 716 (2001) ("[Tlhe recent increase in fines may have resulted in higher-than-optimal 
fines."). The sanction most often believed to be excessive is the private treble damages 
remedy. For a discussion, see infra notes 358-59. 
333 The ABA Antitrust Section, for example, opposed increasing the Sherman Act's 
criminal penalties unless Congress first conducted a series of hearings and concluded as a 
result of information collected in these hearings that the answers to a number of difficult 
questions indicated higher penalties were appropriate. As the Section argued: 
The deterrence issue has no easy answer but simply exemplifies the 
importance of the need for hearings or public briefmgs on these 
issues. . .. Some also believe that combined criminal and civil provide too 
much deterrence that will chill the businessperson in his decision-
making. . .. Whether increased criminal penalties will provide an 
appropriate level of deterrence ... should be the subject of hearings and 
public briefings to reach the proper deterrence balance. 
Comments of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law on H.R. 1086: Increased Criminal Penalties, 
Leniency, Detrebling and the Tunney Act Amendment, at 11-12. 
334 Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Partner, Lantham & Watkins, LLP, Statement Before the 
Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Private Damages Remedies: Treble Damages, Fee 
Shifting, Pre-Judgment Interest Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission, 
Washington, D.C., at 4-5 (July 28, 2005), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edulamc/co 
mmission_hearings/pdf/Lipsky.pdf (citation omitted) ("One can also speculate about why a 
treble damage remedy is needed for deterrence purposes at all, so long as Section 1 and 
Section 2 violations can be--and in the case of cartel violations, typically are--prosecuted 
criminally and punished with actual incarceration for individuals and criminal 
fines. . .. Perhaps the availability of treble damages overcompensates. . .. It is possible 
that treble-damage claims unintentionally assume some of the characteristics of a wealth· 
transfer program that can be gamed to benefit the undeserving ... [similar to criticism that 
can be] levied at other bounty payment mechanisms, including the tributive and unwise 
legal methods that produced or at least inflamed the Salem Witch Trials .... " (footnote 
omitted». For an example of an argument, without empirical evidence, that criminal fines 
and prison terms reduce the need for treble damages in antitrust class actions, see David 
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A difficulty with evaluating the over deterrence argument is 
that the United States imposes a diverse array of sanctions 
against those who collude, including fines and restitution 
payments for the firms involved and prison, house arrest, and 
fines for the corporate officials involved.335 Victims of cartels (both 
direct and, often, indirect as well under state law) can sue for 
mandatory treble damages and costs, including attorney's fees. 336 
Perhaps because of data constraints, complexity, and the number 
of factors involved, until recently no one has even tried a serious 
empirical analysis of the overdeterrence issue. 
As noted above, one of the authors of this piece recently co-
authored an article with Dr. John Connor that determined 
whether the United States' anti-cartel sanctions are optimal 
overall by analyzing the total, combined impact of every existing 
anti-cartel sanction using the standard optimal-deterrence 
model.337 The analysis assumes corporations and individuals 
contemplating illegal collusion will be deterred only if expected 
rewards are less than total costs338 multiplied by the probability 
the illegal activity will be detected and sanctioned.339 
The authors calculated the expected rewards from cartelization. 
They ascertained the average and median amounts of cartel 
Rosenberg & James P. Sullivan, Coordinating Private Class Action and Public Agency 
Enforcement of Antitrust Law, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 159, 162 (2006). 
335 Connor & Lande, supra note 137, at 447. There also are such relatively unusual or 
minor sanctions as disgorgement actions by the FTC or the DOJ. See Einer Elhauge, 
Disgorgement as an Antitrust Remedy, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 79, 79-80 (2009). 
336 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012). 
337 See generally Connor & Lande, supra note 137 (finding sanctions at current levels are 
insufficient for optimal deterrence). 
338 Optimal deterrence depends upon the beliefs of potential cartelists as to a number of 
factors. We would like to know how much potential cartelists expect to gain from their 
collusion, how likely it is they think they will be apprehended, and how large a fine and how 
long a prison term they believe they will receive should they be caught. Unfortunately, we 
have no way of knowing what goes on in the minds of potential cartelists. We only can 
estimate how much actual cartels have gained in the past, what the historical rate of 
apprehension has been, and how heavily they and their employees have been sanctioned. 
We will assume then that the historical outcomes match the cartelists' expectations-an 
admittedly rough approximation. See Connor & Lande, supra note 137, at 431-35 for a 
more detailed discussion. 
339 Id. at 425. In other words, a sanction slightly larger than $300 would be necessary if a 
cartel expects to overcharge by $100 and believes there is a one-third chance its activities 
will be detected and condemned. In operational terms, the optimal penalty will be assumed 
to be equal to the cartel's overcharges divided by the probability the cartel will be detected 
and sanctioned. 
2013] DEFYING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 73 
profits, the probability cartels are detected, and the probability 
detected cartels are sanctioned. They also ascertained the sizes of 
the sanctions involved. These include corporate fines, restitution 
payments, individual fines, and the payouts in private damage 
actions. Finally, they determined the roughly equivalent value (or 
disvalue) for the imprisonment or house arrest for the individuals 
involved.340 
The resulting analysis showed that the combined level of 
United States cartel sanctions has been far too low. If mean 
figures are used, the imposed sanctions are only 16% to 21% as 
large as they should have been for optimal protection of potential 
victims of cartelization.341 If median figures are used, the imposed 
sanctions averaged only 9% to 12% of optimality.342 In sum, the 
overall level of the United States' anti-cartel sanctions should be 
at least five times as high as they are. At least for collusion cases, 
then, two conclusions seem safe: private deterrence does not 
overdeter, and without private enforcement the underdeterrence 
problem would be even worse. 
There is no way to be certain whether these conclusions apply 
to other types of antitrust offenses. The analysis considered only 
hard-core cartels.343 For several reasons, however, a presumption 
of overall underdeterrence is likely appropriate. First, collusion is 
by far the largest category of private cases.344 Second, in some 
ways under deterrence is more likely in ordinary civil cases. Only 
hard-core cartels result in corporate and individual criminal fines, 
340 [d. at 430. 
It is of course impossible to equate incarceration and monetary sanctions in 
an objective manner since this would mean computing the "value" or "cost" 
of time spent in prison or under house arrest. Nevertheless, [the study] 
explaine[d] several social science approximations of the disutility of prison 
time and house arrest, ascertaining and combining many different 
estimates in a conservative manner. 
[d. at 430 n.12. In this way, the study's overall assessment of the aggregate of all the 
anticartel sanctions was both as complete and noncontroversial as possible. The authors 
decided to use $500,000 per month as the cost of both imprisonment and house arrest. [d. 
at 454. 
341 [d. at 476 n.45. 
342 [d. 
343 See id. at 469 n.25 (discussing the elimination of some cartels from the sample for 
various reasons). 
344 See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 16, at 909 (finding twenty-five of forty stuc.y 
cases involved per se cases). 
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and imprisonment and house arrest for the executives involved. 
These factors, of course, figured very heavily in the Connor and 
Lande analysis. Because they would be absent from private cases 
involving monopolization, exclusive dealing, tying, or vertical 
restraints, ceteris paribus, a higher recovery from private litigation 
would be necessary for these offenses to be deterred optimally. 
Further, for most other antitrust violations (including 
monopolization, exclusive dealing, tying, and vertical restraints) 
plaintiffs have to prove that a defendant has monopoly power 
(often by defining a relevant market) and prove the conduct in 
question is anticompetitive.345 These are all extremely formidable 
challenges. By contrast, in a cartel case plaintiffs do not have to 
define the relevant market or prove monopoly power and, if there 
was an agreement to fix prices, there would be no difficulty 
balancing the efficiencies and anticompetitive outcomes involved 
in the case.346 Although the market definition and market power 
issues might well arise at the damages phase of private cartel 
litigation, if plaintiffs make it that far, courts impose a more 
forgiving burden on plaintiffs.347 As a result, their hand in 
settlement negotiations has been strengthened considerably. 
Thus, the imposition of market definition and monopoly power 
screens in private rule of reason cases is significant. 
On the other hand, detection may not be an issue in some 
noncartel cases. For that and other reasons, we do not know the 
extent to which the Connor and Lande results can be generalized 
to other areas of antitrust. But given the evidence of extreme 
underdeterrence in cartel cases, and the lack of any evidence of 
over deterrence there or elsewhere, the case for overdeterrence 
seems quite weak. 
345 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
346 United States v. Socony·Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) (holding price-flxing 
agreements are illegal per se and do not require a showing of anticompetitive effects). 
347 Courts have long recognized than an estimate of damages suffices in antitrust 
cases. Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, Inc. 327 U.S. 251, 264-66 (1946); Story Parchment Co. v. 
Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931). Justice Scalia writing for the 
Court this past Term conflrmed that in antitrust damages "[clalculations need not be 
exact." Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013) (citing Story Parchment, 
282 U.S. at 563). 
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E. PLAINTIFFS' CLASS ACTION LAWYERS OFTEN SELL OUT THEIR 
CLIENTS 
75 
The above analysis does suggest another possibility: plaintiffs 
in private antitrust cases generally recover too little. Put more 
tendentiously, one might suggest that private plaintiffs' 
attorneys-or perhaps just class action attorneys-routinely sell 
out class members.348 For the reasons discussed above, this 
assertion is more plausible than its opposite, even if it is an 
overstatement. Plaintiffs' attorneys do have an incentive to settle 
relatively quickly and for a relatively small amount.349 
In response to this possibility, a few observations are important. 
First, the most straightforward policy reform based on the risk 
that private cases settle for too little is to make it easier for private 
plaintiffs to prevail-to ease, for example, the standard for 
surviving a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment or to get a 
class certified, or to make substantive antitrust doctrine friendlier 
to plaintiffs, such as by relying more heavily on per se and quick 
look analysis rather than applying the full-blown rule of reason. 
The courts, however, have moved doctrine in just the opposite 
direction.350 
A second, and related, observation is that there is a strong 
tension-if not inconsistency-between the "sell out" theory and 
the ''blackmail'' theory. If plaintiffs in private antitrust cases 
receive far too little, it is unlikely that private enforcement results 
in excessive compensation and deterrence effects.351 And yet the 
348 See Wasserman, supra note 149, at 470-71 (''The class members, with so little at stake 
in the first place, have insufficient incentive to closely monitor class counsel and her 
strategic choices. Thus, in a single class action, class counsel's own self-interest may cause 
her to prefer early settlement to trial."); see also Coffee, supra note 43, at 686 ("[Flee awards 
have not been a constant percentage of recoveries, but rather have tended to decline as 
recovery size increases, thereby inclining plaintiffs attorneys to settle more 'cheaply' as the 
damages involved increase."). 
349 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1354-55 (1995) ("Even in the absence of bad faith, suspect settlements 
result in large measure because of the defendants' ability to shop for favorable settlement 
terms, either by contacting multiple plaintiffs' attorneys or by inducing them to compete 
against each other. At its worst, this process can develop into a reverse auction, with the low 
bidder among the plaintiffs' attorneys winning the right to settle with the defendant."). 
350 See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text. 
351 Of course, both could be true. If the wrong plaintiffs recover--direct purchasers, for 
instance, when indirect purchasers are the real victims-then private antitrust enforcement 
could result in both excessive and insufficient compensation. In this example, direct 
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tension between these points has not always been recognized. 
Consider criticism of private antitrust enforcement through class 
actions by Judge Richard Posner: 
The class action is the law's standard answer to the 
problem of aggregating a multitude of small claims, 
but it has serious drawbacks. First, class members 
typically lack an incentive (if their claim is small) or 
the ability (because there are many of them, and so 
there is a free-rider problem as well as the usual costs 
of coordinating the actions of a large group) to monitor 
their lawyers, who may negotiate for weak settlements 
involving large attorneys' fees. Second, the 
aggregation of claims that is central to the class action 
permits class-action lawyers to make plausible though 
not necessarily valid arguments for damages so 
immense that even though the probability that a court 
would award anywhere near the amount sought is very 
slight, the expected cost of the suit, which is the range 
of possible judgments multiplied by their probabilities 
and then summed, may be sufficient to induce a 
settlement, especially if the defendant's management 
is risk averse.352 
One could question much in this analysis-for example, the 
leap from incentives to an implication of unethical conduct, the 
apparent unexplained distinction between the expected cost of a 
suit and its legitimate value in settlement, and the suggestion that 
large antitrust defendants are likely to be more averse to risk than 
contingency fee attorneys. But focus instead on the unexamined 
interplay between the two dynamics at issue: the tendency for the 
plaintiffs' attorneys to accept too little in settlement and their 
ability to obtain too much.353 For all Posner suggests, his 
purchasers could receive excessive compensation and indirect purchasers could receive 
insufficient compensation. But this scenario is unlikely. As discussed above, direct 
purchasers likely suffer some damages from antitrust violations. So if plaintiffs' lawyers 
sell them out, they are likely to recover too little on the whole. 
352 POSNER, supra note 316, at 275. 
353 See Koniak & Cohen, Cloak, supra note 28, at 1111-12 ("!D]efendants care only about 
the total amount they must payout in settlement, not how the payoff is distributed between 
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reasoning could lead to the conclusion that private enforcement is 
calibrated properly. Instead, he expresses skepticism about 
private enforcement, even though, to be fair, he acknowledges that 
he does "not have enough information" to suggest that the 
government should have a monopoly on antitrust enforcement, an 
idea he nonetheless floats. 354 
A third observation is that overall trends matter, not individual 
anecdotes. No doubt plaintiffs' attorneys on some occasions 
recover less than they should (and, on other occasions, more than 
they should). Settlement for just the right amount in every case 
seems extraordinarily unlikely. On average, which way do the 
results tend to fall? 
Gauging the relevant overall trends would be no mean feat. 
Part of the problem lies in developing an objective measure for the 
appropriate outcome in a case. That task is formidable. Assessing 
whether antitrust cases settled for an appropriate amount would 
inevitably give rise to disputes. Once again, we are left with 
inferences. 
The sixty cases we studied can help somewhat in this regard. 
While we cannot know whether those cases settled for the right 
amount, it appears that the plaintiffs' attorneys demanded a 
higher recovery than they might have. Plaintiffs recovered 
approximately $500 million per case on average.355 Defendants 
are unlikely to settle for such a large amount without putting up a 
fight, and plaintiffs are unlikely to obtain such large sums without 
doing the same. So the sixty cases suggest that at least some 
plaintiffs' attorneys in a nontrivial number of cases do not sell out 
their class members entirely. No similar study has been done 
suggesting that plaintiffs' lawyers have often settled for far too 
little in a significant number of meritorious antitrust cases. 
But the empirical evidence is quite thin, which causes us to 
turn to incentives and theory. As noted above, the incentives 
before antitrust plaintiffs' attorneys could lead us to predict they 
class members and the class lawyer. Thus, they are well-positioned and well-motivated to 
propose a deal that gives class counsel a huge slice (high attorney's fees) of a small pie (a 
low overall settlement for the class) and pretty well-assured that class counsel will accept it, 
given how expensive and risky it can be to get a class action certified and ready for trial."). 
354 POSNER, supra note 316, at 276. 
355 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1274 (noting that plaintiffs in 
the sixty cases recovered between $33.8 billion and $35.8 billion). 
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are likely to settle for too little. We should not, however, be too 
quick to jump from predictions to conclusions. The incentive for 
defense attorneys paid by the hour is to drag out litigation and 
undertake unnecessary tasks (not to mention charging for hours 
they never spent on cases so as to maximize the payments they 
receive).356 No doubt these unethical practices sometimes occur. 
But we should develop more than theory-we should have 
evidence-before we attribute improper conduct to defense 
attorneys in general, and we should do the same regarding 
plaintiffs' attorneys. True, defendants may be better situated to 
oversee their attorneys than the clients of plaintiffs' attorneys, 
particularly in class actions. Then again, such oversight is 
generally imperfect, and the requirement of judicial approval of 
class action settlements should ameliorate to some extent 
potential abuses by plaintiffs' attorneys. 
Where does all of this leave us? We cannot support firm 
conclusions. However, to the extent we wish to rely on evidence 
and theory to make antitrust policy-to the extent we have to 
make practical decisions with imperfect knowledge-the most 
plausible position is that private antitrust enforcement does not 
involve the kind of wild "selling out" that warrants its 
abandonment. To the contrary, private enforcement has produced 
tens of billions of dollars worth of compensation and deterrence 
effects-probably greater deterrence effects than criminal 
enforcement by the DOJ. On the other hand, attention to the 
dynamics of the settlement process suggests that private 
enforcement should be strengthened if it is to achieve optimal 
levels of compensation and deterrence. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
As this Article has shown, there is insufficient evidence to 
support the conventional wisdom in the antitrust field that private 
antitrust enforcement is unproductive and even counterproductive. 
356 See Koniak & Cohen, Cloak, supra note 28, at 1112 ("If the court uses the 'lodestar' 
method, which involves multiplying the number of hours worked by some hourly rate and 
then adjusting further based on a risk factor, then class counsel can collude with defendants 
and their lawyers by exaggerating or unnecessarily ruuning [sic) up the class lawyer's 
hours."). 
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Its flaws have been exaggerated beyond recognition and its 
benefits have been seriously underestimated. 
We have examined all of the principal criticisms of private 
enforcement and found that they are unsupported by systematic, 
reliable evidence. Although critics can-and quite often are eager 
to-marshal anecdotes or at least hypotheticals illustrating 
virtually any point they wish to make, they have never presented 
systematic evidence for their conclusions. By contrast, the benefits 
of private enforcement have been enormous. Private enforcement 
is virtually the only way for victims of antitrust violations to be 
compensated for their losses, and this compensation has totaled 
tens of billions of dollars.357 Moreover, the deterrence effects of 
private litigation are underappreciated and also immense. Indeed, 
the evidence suggests that private enforcement probably does 
more to deter anticompetitive conduct than the universally 
acclaimed DOJ anti-cartel program.358 
Nevertheless, highly respected scholars, including Professors 
Calkins and Kovacic, believe that because many judges accept the 
field's conventional wisdom, they systematically bias virtually 
every aspect of antitrust litigation in defendants' favor. 359 These 
357 Davis & Lande, Empirical Assessment, supra note 16, at 1272 (finding $33.8 billion to 
$35.8 billion in compensation to plaintiffs in the sixty cases studied). 
358 See Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence, supra note 16, at 317 ("[Aj quantitative 
analysis of the facts demonstrates that private antitrust enforcement probably deters more 
anticompetitive conduct than the DOJ's anti·cartel program."). We reiterate that we, too, 
applaud the DOJ's anti·cartel program. We would rank it as being among the very best of 
all government programs, especially considering its relatively low cost to taxpayers. 
359 Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of 
Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1140 (1986) ("One of 
the ways in which courts have adjusted to the treble damages remedy is by being relatively 
more willing to keep cases from going to trial."). 
As Professor (former FTC general council) William E. Kovacic observed, 
[Aj court might fear that the US statutory requirement that successful 
private plaintiffs receive treble damages runs a risk of over-deterrence. A 
court might seek to correct such perceived infirmities in the anti-trust 
system by recourse to means directly within its control-namely by 
modifying doctrine governing liability standards or by devising special 
doctrinal tests to evaluate the worthiness of private claims. 
See William E. Kovacic, Private Participation in the Enforcement of Public 
Competition Laws, in 2 CURRENT COMPETITION LAw 167, 173-74 (Mads Andenas et 
al. eds., 2004). 
[Ejven though the courts, by and large, deny this, there is undoubtedly a 
different standard in antitrust cases in a number of respects. There is a 
tougher summary judgment rule for plaintiffs. There's much tougher 
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scholars believe that many judges' disdain for private enforcement 
causes them to favor defendants in close cases when they 
formulate substantive antitrust rules, when they develop standing 
and class action certification rules, or when they measure 
ambiguous factual situations against these rules.360 Many courts 
might find in defendants' favor in close cases and "trebly penalize" 
defendants and "over-reward" plaintiffs only when the activity at 
issue was overwhelmingly outrageous and far from the line 
separating legality from illegality. 
The irony, of course, is that to the extent these scholars are 
correct, judges have been acting upon a belief that is without basis. 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, from a plaintiffs perspective, much 
tougher Rule 12 standards for plaintiffs. There is a very rigorous set of 
standards in antitrust injury doctrine that in the Sixth Circuit probably 
means that no plaintiff should be allowed to sue at all .... 
[D]o we have these sort of out-of-sorts doctrines in antitrust, these 
pro-defendant doctrines, as a reaction to treble damages? 
Jonathan M. Jacobson, Comm'r, Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Public Hearing at 57-58 
(July 28, 2005), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edulamc/commission_hearings/pdfl05 
0728_Civil_Remedies_TranscripCreform.pdf. 
360 See Stephen Calkins, Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, with Special 
Attention to Summary Judgment and to Motions to Dismiss, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST 
LITIGATION 185, 197-98 (Lawrence J. White ed., 1988) (discussing the effect treble damages 
have had on the evolution of antitrust law). Professor Calkins discusses how the law of 
monopolization, horizontal restraints, and vertical restraints might have developed more 
narrowly because of the effects of damages awards that the courts believed to be treble. Id. 
at 191-95. He concludes that "class actions probably would be more easily certified were 
there no trebling." Id. at 197. Professor Calkins also marshals support by demonstrating 
why "it seems probable that trebling is a factor" in causing courts to "scrutiniz[e] damage 
claims more rigorously than they once did." Id. at 198. "Plaintiffs would find standing 
rules more hospitable in a single-damage world." Id. See also John F. Hart, Standing 
Doctrine in Antitrust Damage Suits, 1890-1975: Statutory Exegesis, Innovation, and the 
Influence of Doctrinal History, 59 TENN. L. REV. 191, 241-42 (1992) ("The lower courts' 
rulings on other matters were commonly attributed to antipathy toward antitrust litigation. 
It would be curious if standing decisions failed to reflect that antipathy .... " (footnote 
omitted)). Kovacic, supra note 359, at 175, explained that where courts 
fear that the remedial scheme (eg mandatory treble damages for all 
offenses) deters legitimate business conduct excessively, the courts will use 
measures within their control to correct the perceived imbalance. The 
courts will "equilibrate" the antitrust system in one of three ways: 
· .. [Clonstruct doctrinal tests under the rubric of "standing" or "injury" 
that make it harder for the private party to pursue its case; or 
· .. [A]djust evidentiary requirements that must be satisfied to prove 
violations; or 
· .. [A]lter substantive liability rules in ways that make it more difficult for 
the plaintiff to establish the defendant's liability. 
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Their decisions to bias the course of antitrust litigation-perhaps 
unconsciously and implicitly rather than knowingly and 
explicitly-have been inappropriate. Moreover, to the extent 
judicial distaste for private enforcement has shaped substantive 
antitrust rules, this also has inappropriately undermined public 
enforcement because public enforcement uses these same 
substantive rules. 
By assembling the evidence contained in this Article, we hope to 
help the truth emerge and prevail.361 We also urge judges to 
demand hard evidence of private enforcement's faults. If they find 
such hard evidence lacking, they should formulate neutral 
substantive and procedural rules, and measure facts against these 
rules in an even-handed manner. Substantive antitrust rules, 
standing and class certification rules, and the methodology by 
which damages are calculated should all be revisited in light of 
this Article's findings. 
361 Pessimists might accept the antitrust field's view of private enforcement as a given, 
even though it is without basis. Pessimists therefore might desire to decimate or even 
abolish private enforcement simply to preserve what little still exists of public enforcement. 
However, because private enforcement probably deters more anticompetitive conduct than 
public enforcement, and achieves almost all of the compensation for victims, we believe this 
course of action would be unwise. 
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